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JPRS Report

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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CONTENTS

23 November 1994

RUSSIAN MILITARY

ARMED FORCES ISSUES

| | |
|--|---|
| Yeltsin's Support for Grachev Criticized [MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS 22 Oct] | 1 |
| Duma Hearings on Military Budget Previewed [SEGODNYA 10 Nov] | 3 |
| Mistreatment of Draftees, Crime in Military [OBSHCAYA GAZETA 1994] | 4 |

MILITARY POLICY

| | |
|---|----|
| Col-Gen Vorobyev on Military Finances [CHEST IMEYU Sep] | 10 |
|---|----|

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

| | |
|---|----|
| Gen Lebed on Defense Budget, Army Reform [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 16 Nov] | 17 |
| Western Naval Applications of Stealth Technology [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 4-6 Nov] | 21 |

AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

| | |
|--|----|
| Into the Stratosphere, but Without Pants [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Nov] | 22 |
| Air Army Commander Relieved After AN-12 Crash [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 10 Nov] | 23 |

NAVAL FORCES

| | |
|--|----|
| Case Made for Viability of Strategic Nuclear Submarines [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 25 Oct] | 23 |
| Medical Radiation Treatment Facility in Obninsk [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 10 Nov] | 26 |

CIS & REGIONAL MILITARY AFFAIRS

UKRAINE

| | |
|---|----|
| Military Cooperation, 'Partnership for Peace' Participation Explored | 27 |
| NATO-Warsaw Pact 'Bridge of Cooperation-94' Activity [NARODNA ARMIYA 5 Oct] | 27 |
| Ministry of Defense Briefing on 'Bridge of Cooperation-94' [NARODNA ARMIYA 19 Oct] | 28 |
| Ukrainian Unit in the Netherlands [NARODNA ARMIYA 27 Oct] | 29 |
| Exercise Participation in the Netherlands [NARODNA ARMIYA 28 Oct] | 30 |
| Regional Sponsorship, Support for Ukraine's Navy Detailed | 30 |
| Military Council Appeal on Sponsorship [NARODNA ARMIYA 27 Oct] | 30 |
| Western Oblasts Sponsor Warships, Ryzhenko Heads Commission [NARODNA ARMIYA 28 Oct] | 30 |
| Bezkorovaynyy, Martyrosyan Meet on Sponsorship [NARODNA ARMIYA 29 Oct] | 31 |
| Ivano-Frankivsk Role, Bezkorovaynyy Visit [NARODNA ARMIYA 2 Nov] | 31 |
| Khmelnitsky Oblast Role, Bezkorovaynyy Visit [NARODNA ARMIYA 3 Nov] | 31 |
| Security Service Head Discusses SBU Work, Problems [NARODNA ARMIYA 27 Oct] | 31 |

GENERAL ISSUES

ARMS TRADE

Arms Sales To Be Insured Via Russia Carriers [*KOMMERSANT DAILY 22 Oct*] 34

PEACEKEEPING/PEACEMAKING

Uneasy Peacekeeping Situation in South Ossetia [*KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 10 Nov*] 34

ARMED FORCES ISSUES

Yeltsin's Support for Grachev Criticized

954F0302A Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLET
in Russian 22 Oct 94 pp 1, 7

[Article by Aleksandr Minkin: "The President on Grachev"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mr. President! Boris Nikolayevich! You didn't you come to see the journalist Dmitriy Kholodov off on his final journey. Why?

He was irreproachable. Do you understand—irreproachable. You don't have people like him around you.

You are older. We are younger. But...

As it happened, you didn't fight. And we fought. We have had the scent of gunpowder in our nostrils, Boris Nikolayevich. And you—dust from the carpets at the CPSU Central Committee.

Why didn't you come?

A meeting with the King of Great Britain—that is a great thing. A funeral for a Russian journalist—is that a small thing?

In 1990, when you were a dissident, when you were working together with Sakharov,—then, you would have come.

For the sake of politics or to answer your heart—I don't know. But you would have come.

Today, you have different people around you. Not Sakharov, none of your fellow fighters from your time in disfavor. Some are already gone, and others are even further.

Yesterday, we cried for Dima. Breathlessly, we listened to what his mama said about Dima.

If you had come —we would have been happy. In sorrow, we look for sympathy and support.

And not because you signify money (we haven't gotten a kopeck from the state in ages). And not because the president's presence means success. Our readers are not great admirers of yours.

No, it wasn't for success or advertisement that we needed you on the day of the funeral. We, the citizens of Russia, wanted to see that the head of the country was with us at that moment.

But you needed us much more.

We will leave emotion to the poor and naive.

You are the president. For you, the situation mandates not spiritual acts, but sober accounting.

Instead of coming to the funeral, you were praising the minister of defense.

And what have you won from that?

If you had come to the funeral of our comrade, to the funeral of a talented Russian journalist, to the funeral of a young man who died at the hands of scoundrels (whoever they were),—wouldn't you have gained some respect in the eyes of the people?

The eyes of the people. Not the democrats, not the extremists, not the leftists, not the rightists... Russians and Chechens, soldiers and civilians, young people and old all are respectful of Dima Kholodov. PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA speak about him with respect, although there will never be any love lost between those newspapers and MK. Most of the newspapers gave their first pages not to Korolev's visit, but to Dmitriy Kholodov's death.

This is a unique situation: no complaints about a journalist! And not because he was killed, and we either say good things about the dead, or nothing at all. No, even while he was alive, Dmitriy Kholodov evoked respect, with an approach to business and people that was wise beyond his years.

If you had come to the funeral of a bestially murdered journalist, you would have gained much in the eyes of the people. And it is they, the people, who will be voting sooner or later, respected Boris Nikolayevich.

Instead of this, you were busy praising Grachev to the skies. And this was on the very day when the article "Pasha-Mercedes" came out in MK, with the subtitle "A robber should be sitting in jail...not being minister of defense," with devastating quotes from the criminal case on corruption in the Army, in which the Grachev, the minister of defense, was directly concerned.

MK writes about how the commander of state troops [ZGV] [Western Group of Forces] sold 500 Ural trucks, at 4,500 notes apiece, and bought two luxurious Mercedes, at 160 thousand each. MK writes about how Grachev spends money on himself that is earmarked for the construction of homes for homeless officers, and you, Mr. President, on the same evening, pay homage to him! What—don't you read the most popular newspaper in Russia?

Maybe you're so busy that you don't have time for newspapers. But you probably have time to read your own memoirs.

The President's Notes

Summer, 1991. Not long before the putsch, I visited a model Tula division. Pavel Grachev, the paratroop commander, showed me the combat units.

And I, hesitating, decided to ask him a difficult question: "Pavel Sergeyevich, let's say a situation occurs where our legally elected government in Russia is threatened by

danger—some kind of terrorist act, a conspiracy, people are trying to arrest... Can we count on the military, can we count on you?" He answered: "Yes, you can."

And then, on the 19th, I called him on the telephone. It was one of my very first calls from Arkhangelskiy. I reminded him of our long-ago conversation.

Grachev became embarrassed, there was a long pause, during which I could hear his stressed breathing on the other end of the line.

September 19, 1993. Grachev has begun attacking Barsukhov, saying that he just doesn't believe success is possible. And it just isn't a good idea to meddle in such a large problem where the mood is like that. Everyone is absolutely prepared for the president to take that step, and the Army just can't wait. And there is nothing to be afraid of here. The White House will be ours, and so will victory.

October 3, 1993. I called Grachev again. He announced that troops were already in Moscow, that they were moving along Leninskiy Prospekt, Yaroslavskiy, and other Moscow highways...right now, powerful army divisions will be approaching Ostankino. Very soon, the television center will be completely liberated.

I ask to be connected with the GAI [traffic police] duty officer, so he can tell me exactly how many kilometers away from Ostankino the combat units are located. In a few minutes, the Russian GAI chief, General Fedorov, calls. He says that there are no troops in Moscow at all.

Many of the people who appeared on screen were outraged that Yeltsin stayed silent, and demanded directly that the president speak his piece.

But at that moment, I was busy with a more substantial task. Unfortunately, I wasn't up to making a speech. I was trying to get my combat generals out of their stressful state, their paralysis. I saw that the Army, despite all the assurances given by the minister of defense, for some reason was incapable of immediate participation in Moscow's defense.

...by three in the morning, I had the following picture. The militia, which was not supposed to become involved in conflicts, took off after the first attack, leaving the city to be torn to pieces by armed bandits. And the Army, which numbers two and a half million people, couldn't even come up with a thousand soldiers, even one regiment that might find itself in Moscow and help to defend the city.

...The generals looked gloomy and guilty. They, too, evidently, sensed the awkwardness of the situation: the legal government is hanging from a thread, and the Army can't protect it—once you've sat on a potato, you don't want to fight anymore...

I saw how the generals brightened, how Chernomyrdin's spirits rose. When a real plan appeared...announcing that tanks could be in position at seven in the morning.

Chernomyrdin asked: "Does anyone have any significant objections, is the plan accepted?" Everyone nodded approvingly. Then Grachev asked to speak. He, pronouncing his words slowly, turned to me: "Boris Nikolayevich, do you sanction my use of tanks in Moscow?"

I looked at him. In silence. He answered with the same direct stare, then looked away. Chernomyrdin couldn't restrain himself, and said: "Pavel Sergeyevich, what's going on, you have been given command of the operations, why should the president decide which specific means are necessary for this?!" Grachev said something like, of course, he would make the decision independently, but it was important for him to make sure...

I rose, requested that the remaining details be discussed without me, and said to Grachev: "I'll send you the order in writing."

These are your words, Boris Nikolayevich, these are your own memoirs.

And here are the words that you spoke yesterday from television screens on all the channels:

—The Armed Forces, and the minister of defense, personally, played a major role in the October events of last year. This was the defense of democracy in Russia. And, of course, the opposition still cannot forgive Grachev for this. For this reason, there have been various insinuations; yes, a journalist, Dmitriy Kholodov, was killed, all of us are upset about this, it was a tragedy...but one simply cannot seriously connect Dmitriy Kholodov's death with the fact that the minister of defense was involved. This is an important state figure, this is the minister of defense, the current minister of defense, who is honored by the troops, who is honored by the president, who is respected in the government, who is respected by the legislative branch. This, perhaps, is one of the strongest ministers of defense in the last decade. In the former country, and now, in Russia. So I have asked you, too, all the same, to somehow help end the muckraking that is going on around him, you understand, the lack of objectivity.

We were having a wake at the editorial offices. But at 1900, we left our tables so we could watch the news on TV. And we heard your words.

You cannot imagine how much you offended us.

We interrupted our farewell speeches again, as well, and again went to the television: NTV "Novosti," "Vesti," "Ostankino Novosti", again NTV, again "Vesti"... We were probably drunk—how else can one explain the mindless hope that you might say something different on the next edition of the television news.

Did you swear an oath to Grachev, is that it? Even if you did—Grachev has already betrayed that oath by effacing his honor as an officer.

Are you demonstrating your faith in the friendship? Nobody is hindering your continuing friendship with the

retired General Grachev; you can even send him packages. Because one's friendship, you will agree, is with the person, not the position. Or exactly what is the accepted practice in the "higher echelons?"

We were with you in August '91, and in October '93. And it wasn't for the sake of former or future pittances from the budget, but because we considered it our duty.

And you could have come to us in that moment, to settle a debt, or from a feeling of duty, or because your soul was moved.

And now, even if you decide to give Dima or his family some kind of award (posthumously), we will have to think hard: should we accept it or not. We, ourselves, are also fairly solvent, and there is no lack of people wishing to help out.

[Signed] Aleksandr MINKIN

P.S. Boris Nikolayevich, would you like to be convinced that Grachev is not the minister of defense? Let "Pasha-Mercedes" give the order to attack MK to any of the divisions subordinate to him. We'll see what happens.

Yesterday, a woman called MK: "I was a defender of the White House in August, 1990. I was awarded a medal for it. On Thursday, I heard what the president said about Grachev. Because of it, I am returning my medal.

Duma Hearings on Military Budget Previewed

954F0320A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 10 Nov 94 p 2

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer: "The Military Budget and Civilian Control"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Duma is beginning discussion of the "harsh" anti-inflationary budget for 1995. The Ministry of Finance, supported by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, has limited the expenditures of the Ministry of Defense to four percent of the gross national product (GNP), and since the GNP is decreasing, military spending will also decrease. It is not likely that discussion in the Duma will seriously change these figures.

There is a group of lobbyists in the Duma who are considerably more influential than the military. Agriculture, for example. Other paramilitary departments—Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry for Emergency Situations, Border Guards—are now in the good graces of authorities. Their budgets are increasing, and the wages of officers are twice as high as in the Army. The financial needs of the Ministry of Defense are causing natural objections in the government and in the Duma—first get your own house in order, investigate corruption, and then demand additional funds.

Indeed, there are serious grounds to believe that strange things are taking place with the budget trillions in the military department, which the newspaper SEGODNYA was writing about already in August. And this does not

involve the former Western Group of Forces [WGF], which all the noise is about now. You see, all these years after the signing of the agreement on the withdrawal of troops, the WGF was financed almost entirely from the FRG budget. The Germans paid for the withdrawal, for the stay, and for housing construction. Accordingly, operations of the "WGF trade mafia" with duty-free alcohol and cigarettes and other machinations inflicted damage primarily on the FRG, not Russia. However, the Germans were patient, expecting the quickest possible completion of the withdrawal.

The damage from all this for the Russian budget is not so much in the direct as in the lost gain, which was written about in detail in the famous report by Yuriy Boldyrev. Moreover, the "WGF trade mafia" is a thing of the past; the history of the WGF ended on 31 August. However, other incomprehensible histories associated with the defense budget remained. Many in the military point to the Main Military Budget and Financing Directorate of the Ministry of Defense as the main source of many financial disorders in the Army.

The chief of the Main Military Budget and Financing Directorate, Colonel-General Vasily Vorobyev, has been complaining publicly for the second year now that the funds allocated for defense are incomprehensibly "disappearing" during the transfer from the Ministry of Finance in commercial banks and structures. True, the money is later "found," but it sometimes takes up to a year to find it. It is possible that the money is not accidentally "disappearing," but is earning interest. The income received as a result is much easier to dispose of at one's own discretion than the budget funds themselves.

But even if the disorder with the use of state funds in the Ministry of Defense is explained not by malicious intent but by the stupidity and bungling of military finance officers, the damage inflicted on the state and the Army is tremendous. The already meager budget is being eaten up by inflation, suppliers to the military department are suffering severe financial losses, the crisis of non-payments is becoming more critical, and corruption and decay among top military leaders are increasing.

In any case, to offer the professional military a fixed percentage of the GNP in order for them to further investigate their problems themselves makes no sense. There are no specialists at the General Staff who are able to accurately calculate the future GNP even if for the next five years in order later to compile a clear and concrete plan for reorganizing the Army, which, as we know, consists of a quite specific number of divisions armed with equally specific tanks, aircraft, missiles, and nuclear-powered submarines.

Top military leaders have been stating publicly for several years now that the Army is not in a position to reform itself. But instead of assuming (in accordance with the Constitution) full responsibility for the state of

affairs in the Armed Forces and conducting a reorganization of the Army in accordance with society's interests, civilian authorities simply take 4-5 percent of GNP from the Army.

As a result, the budget reduction affected not the top levels of the Army but rather its lower levels. However, the lower levels will not stay silent forever. Limiting the defense budget without a radical and immediate reorganization of the Armed Forces almost inevitably end with rebellion of a hungry Army next year, in 1995.

This will not be a conspiracy but a spontaneous outrage spreading from garrison to garrison like the miner strikes of 1989. A dual power will again be established in our country, since military councils of various levels will be added to the existing constitutional branches, and the political structure of the Russian Federation, looking so stable, will begin to crumble like the state structure of the USSR after 1989.

Mistreatment of Draftees, Crime in Military

95UM0069A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 43, 1994 p 6

[Article by Yelena Skvortzova: "Good-by Boys! Try To Come Back...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] It just happened that way. Our special correspondent Yelena Skvortzova left for St. Petersburg prior to the beginning of the scandal that involved the names of the highest Russian military officials. Certainly only a court can answer the question of whether the leadership of the Ministry of Defense is guilty in the death of the journalist Dmitriy Kholodov. But the generals have many other deaths and mutilated fates of boys in uniform on their conscience. And this is obvious.

The Russian Army is sick. It has been for a long time. And the illness is becoming more and more chronic in nature. It has many threatening symptoms. Corruption.... Dealing in weapons.... Violations of human rights.... The laws of the "zone" that prevail in many military units.... Demoralized state of officers and their families, whose very acute everyday social problems are not being resolved by anyone.... Persistent rumors of abuses in the Western Group of Forces that have not yet been refuted by any court....

What is the secret here for anyone? Just as for any right-thinking citizen there is no secret in the answer to the question: Who is responsible for this?

A minister of defense who has been in the highest position of the army for three years cannot fail to sense such a personal responsibility. He has no right.

...These St. Petersburg materials were prepared for publication a week after the tragic Monday of 17 October. It just happened that way. Can one really speak of a coincidence, however?

In the three years of its existence, the organization "Soldiers' Mothers of St. Petersburg" has collected a large file of human suffering—1,200 statements from parents and their children suffering from the army ways. This is just in Leningrad Military District. And it is only those cases that ended in the hospital or even more horribly—with death. This is 1,200 people who suffered misfortune. And this is more than an army regiment.

People Whose Lives Are Worth Nothing

It is paradoxical but despite all the horror that the word "army" brings to parents, today there are still a lot of youths who want to go serve. Most of the named 1,200 wrote in their statements: "I willingly went to the army."

FROM THE HISTORY OF THE SICKNESS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY. A.A. Shklarov, born 1975, was called to active military service in the army by the Krasnoselskiy Rayon Military Commissariat on 24 January 1994. And he was sent from St. Petersburg to Vologda for service there, Military Unit 7409. Sasha died seven months later. He was 19.

TESTIMONY. From the letter of Aleksandr's mother: "On 25 July, I received a telegram from Vologda on the death of my son and that same evening I traveled to the unit, where they gave me a certificate on the death of my son with the conclusion: 'suicide by hanging.' It seems as though they pinched him to death. No sign of a rope could be seen on his neck. I did not agree with the physician's conclusion on the cause of my son's death but they told me that they had no clean forms and therefore they could not rewrite the certificate. They gave me the certificate without the stamp of the unit and without a number or signature. For this reason, they did not want to draw up the documents in the burial office.

"In the unit, they showed me a suicide note from Sasha to me. The note was torn and glued to cardboard and it was obviously not written by my son's hand. They did not give this note to me. That same July there was another incident of a death of a soldier here.

"I had only one son, whom I gave up to the army, counting on the honesty and decency of our military people...."

CIVIL INDICTMENT. Ella Polyakova, chairman of "Soldiers' Mothers of St. Petersburg," relates:

Servicemen in compulsory service are essentially a category of slaves. Their life has no value. One can do with them what one wishes. For this reason, there is no need even for the military to carry out an investigation of the deaths of soldiers.

We understand very well that there can be no state without an army. And no one is saying it should be destroyed. But the army must be healed and we must do this together. In Israel, they recently had an emergency meeting of the cabinet of ministers because of the capture of one (!) serviceman. In Argentina, one boy died

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in the army from "dedovshchina" [hazing of new conscripts]. And that same day (!) the government of the country met and abolished conscription service. When our government has emergency meetings in such cases, that is when something will change in our country. Unfortunately, the reality here is still something else.

There was a case in which an entire platoon came to our organization. They really were not asking for anything. They simply wanted to serve under normal conditions. A person had been slaughtered right before the eyes of the soldiers in their unit.

It is frightening when people die. It is even more frightening when young people die this way in peacetime, senselessly and horribly. A few years ago under an edict by President Gorbachev, they established a state commission to investigate the reasons for deaths and injuries in the army. According to experts, the commission did not work overly fruitfully. But it is difficult to call even the report that it presented to the president on 5 May 1991 optimistic. It examined 12,250 complaints of parents (just for the period from December 1990 through February 1991). Of them, 6,240 involved the deaths of soldiers. In 50 percent of these cases, the cause of the soldier's death is shown to be suicide.

The Hunt Is On!

We certainly do not need an army in which our children are killed and become invalids. It is just incomprehensible that the army itself needs this. And how can one come to any other conclusion if the reform of the army has been practically frozen? The contract system of manpower acquisition has just not been developed. The army is stubbornly unwilling to become a volunteer professional army. Of course it must enter into some obligations to the contract soldier: pay, kind of work, living conditions, food.... This is complicated, because today's recruits are very simply facing the necessity of not only losing two years of their lives without pay and without having anything to say about it but also of very possibly losing their health or even their lives. On the other hand, it is generally known that the combat capability of contemporary armies is supported not by the number of those mobilized but by the technical equipment and professional skills of service personnel. Many officers understand this.

But the Russian Army, as never before, is now fighting for an induction plan that cannot be fulfilled. The edict of the president from 3 October 1994 states: "In October through December of 1994, induct into military service...251,600 citizens of the Russian Federation born in the years 1967 through 1976."

In the words of Sergey Vishnyak, staff officer in Leningrad Military Oblast, this plan is being established "from below":

"The military commissariats have a registration board, which the youth goes through at the age of 17. They

register him with the military commissariat and examine him. If they find any illnesses, they give him an opportunity to get well. If the youth is healthy, they reexamine him and upon reaching the age of 18 he is given notice and sent to serve. The overall conscription plan is actually prepared on the basis of information from these registration boards."

This is quite reasonable technology. But why has this plan been getting larger and larger from the spring to the fall in St. Petersburg, for example? One cannot bring into the army more boys than were born in 1967-76, for there was no "population explosion" precisely in those years in Leningrad, which has not prided itself on a high birth rate for a long time. It is possibly because, in the words of that same Lieutenant Colonel Vishnakov, the "induction plan for 1993 was only 22 percent fulfilled in the country. The draft was extended until 1994. The result was that they recruited 53 percent. In 1994, things will be a little better: by the spring, they had already drafted 88 percent."

From where did they "recruit" this 88 percent? In May 1994, a national congress on the health of Russia was held in St. Petersburg. The report by Professor Liliya Levina from Mariinskaya Hospital presented the following information. In the spring of 1994, physicians could not recruit a group of healthy upperclassmen: 60 percent were simply "chronic" and the rest borderline. Under normal conditions, such a child still feels passable but in extreme situations he dies.

One can only guess whether life in the army should be considered as normal or extreme conditions.

Weapons in the Hands of the Infirm

"We do not advocate drafting sick children into the army," said Sergey Vishnyak.

I have no trouble believing him. The situation with the draft is so mixed up that it is difficult to escape the vicious circle. Under the law, for example, it is civil authority that drafts and has responsibility for the draft. What is happening in St. Petersburg?

CIVIL INDICTMENT. Ella Polyakova relates:

The city draft board did not meet even once. No one among those who appealed to us received its permission, as is required by law. The city military commissar is deputy chairman of the draft board and the chief of the second department of the city military commissariat is secretary: they are fulfilling the plan and they control themselves.

The military commissariats are made up of people too. They also have to feed their families. And to fulfill an unrealistic plan, they violate the law and employ repressive methods. The police help them. They do not simply pick up the boys but they grab them! They organize street raids and they burst into apartments.... It does not matter whether you are sick or healthy. And age makes

no difference either. All men up to the age of 27 are subject to the draft. There was an amazing case here. In December, the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] came to one mother. And her boy had already served. They came to them all winter, trying to call up someone who had already served.... In Petrogradskiy Rayon, parents came with their son to the rayon military commissariat to report that their boy was in school. But according to the documents of the military commissariat, he has already been serving for six months! As it turned out, there is also a plan to induct those with a criminal record. The border troops are taking schizophrenics and people who have served time.

FROM THE HISTORY OF THE SICKNESS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY: M.I. Rogov, born 1976. From the age of 10, he was repeatedly in inpatient treatment for a heart ailment. He is being treated by a psychiatrist and a therapist. Mikhail had enuresis (involuntary urination) day and night. Because of his illnesses, he completed only six and a half grades of education. But despite all of the medical documents, he was found suitable for service. And...he was sent to the missile forces in Plesetsk on 6 June.

To the credit of N. Meshcheryakov, commander of Military Unit 21333, it must be noted that on 6 July he did mail a letter to Rogov's parents asking that they send him "extracts from the history of the illnesses suffered by your son certified in medical institutions."

In the unit, the soldiers "made fun of" Rogov, putting carbide in his canteen. Mikhail received chemical poisoning. He was sent to Naryan-Mar instead of to the hospital. But there one of the officers refused to accept the sick soldier and immediately sent him back to Plesetsk for treatment.

CIVIL INDICTMENT. Ella Polyakova relates:

If it had not been for our intervention, they would have declared him suitable for further service. I saw the woman physician who "allowed" Misha to serve in the North (for this one generally has to pass a special board). She is a young woman. I asked her: "How could you?" She said nothing.

The case of Misha Rogov is typical. Today the army takes everyone. Later, to be sure, the army itself tries—sometimes!—to get rid of "all" these (it is an expensive pleasure and all of us taxpayers pay for it). Here is a letter from Yu. Gerkiyal, commander of Military Unit 48370: "I am sending a list of military construction personnel who were inducted in December 1993 through March 1994 with illnesses that are incompatible with service in the army in accordance with Ministry of Defense Order No. 260 from 1987." This list includes 18 persons. Every one of them has a whole bunch of illnesses. The most common are different forms of psychopathic illness and oligophrenia in the stage of slight retardation.

FROM THE HISTORY OF THE SICKNESS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY. A.A. Yablochkin, born 1975. He was in a children's home from the age of five. In 1991, he finished the special boarding school No 23 for mentally retarded children. But since Aleksey is an orphan and there was no one to stand up for him, on 4 December 1993 Alesha Yablochkin ended up in a construction battalion. And he served seven months there. They beat him all the time—"for everything." He ran away. While "Soldiers' Mothers" was dealing with Aleksey's documents, the military commandant's office caught up with him (in St. Petersburg, former "Afghans" handle searches of this kind). They called up officers from Oranienbaum.... There he was kept for five days in a cage (a cold narrow space where one can only stand). They brought Alesha a stool for the night. But before sleep they gave him "preventive treatment": an officer came and beat him....

CIVIL INDICTMENT. Ella Polyakova relates:

Alesha was shaking all over when we liberated him from this cage. And the hands of the unit commander were shaking too: with a scandal like this, they could remove him.

The military people wanted to put Alesha in a hospital right away, their psychiatric unit. But what for? We brought all of his documents, showing that Yablochkin is registered and has his psychiatric card. The physician says: treat him on an outpatient basis. But this diagnosis is for life!

We forced them to draw up the release documents for Aleksey and we came with an accompanying officer to the military commissariat. They all had nothing to say.... We sent letters to everyone. The chief psychiatrist of the city looked into our request and presented documents showing that such a lad should not be brought into the army at all. But nothing happened. Alesha is still considered a criminal—a deserter! And more than 500 such "criminals" are registered with our organization....

Let us add that every "runner" automatically becomes a criminal regardless of the reasons that drove him from his unit. Criminal charges are pressed against him. Get him!

Does this mean that the army really does need sick people? I admit (with great reserve, to be sure) that the medical boards may not receive some essential documents and may "let through" an obviously unhealthy recruit (although not in such numbers, of course). But what happens then? After all, the military investigators go after the "runners," even the sick ones, throughout the country. By no means do they do this out of humane investigation. We saw this in the example of Alesha Yablochkin. They search for the boys with photographs, as though they were criminals. When they find them, they put them in handcuffs. They lock them in the stockades or in cages.... Why does our army need people like Misha Rogov and Alesha Yablochkin?

Yura Storozhenko, Who Did Not Want To Hang Himself

FROM THE HISTORY OF THE SICKNESS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY: Yu.N. Storozhenko, born in 1975. His mother is on pension. He is the sole breadwinner. The family also includes a minor orphan niece. Under the law, they should have granted Yura a deferment from induction for this reason alone. Add to this the eight brain concussions that the boy suffered in his childhood.... But the Cherepovets Military Commissariat called him up to active military service on 9 December 1993. He was sent to Military Unit 11209 at Pavlosk near St. Petersburg.

Yura served exactly two days. After that he was brought to the hospital unconscious. There he received an eloquent greeting from the "dedy" [older soldiers]: "Listen, 'dukh' (young soldier in the army jargon—Ye.S.), we are fed up with you. Because of you Didimych is not giving us a commission. Besides the fact that you scrubbed the toilet seat with a toothbrush and (illegible). You will lick our heels. Remember that you are for (illegible) and are nothing more than that. And we advise to hang yourself. If you do not have the courage to hang yourself (illegible), we will find a way to help you. God forbid that you show this note to anyone. You will die before your time is up. We 'dedy' don't care. We have just 90 days before we get our separation papers. And in 90 days we will drink to your internal rest. Remember that you are a 'dukh.'"

Yura did not want to hang himself, which is quite normal. He ran away. He lived next to a rubbish chute in some driveway for two weeks in bitter cold. Children brought him food. Then a family took pity on him, warmed him up, and brought him to "Soldiers' Mothers."

CIVIL INDICTMENT. Attorney Andrey Yarikhin relates:

Most of those in our organization are women. Apparently in this case maternal feelings prevailed over the usual sober assessment of what must be done and they called the unit command and said: "Don't worry, your soldier is fine. He did not die!!" A group of officers immediately came to us and very persistently inquired about whether the serviceman Storozhenko was sleeping on white sheets and whether he was eating three times a day.

The boy was examined. It turned out that prior to being drafted into the army he had suffered a skull and brain injury. It seems that he received another injury in the unit. And besides that, it was finally "discovered" that his mother is on pension. And this is another reason why they should not have inducted him into the army. Yura's mother came and tried to take her son to Cherepovets: he needed hospitalization. But at the railroad station, officers from the unit grabbed him. And these people, who were so concerned about his eating three times a day and sleeping on white sheets, sent a person with two skull and brain injuries to the stockade.

Even before he was arrested, the procuracy of St. Petersburg Garrison wrote a letter to the city procuracy about our organization, saying that we did not want to contact officials of the military procuracy. They also wrote about how bad we are. On 17 March, representatives of this same "bad organization" went to the military prosecutor of Leningrad District and put on his desk documents on Storozhenko's state of health. The prosecutor had to pick up the phone and demand that Yura be released from the stockade and sent to the hospital immediately.

It was necessary to go to the district prosecutor to get elementary medical assistance for a soldier!

Yura Storozhenko was not released from the army until 28 April. The law "On the Military Obligation" states (Article 49) that with the revelation of circumstances that would give a soldier a deferment from the draft he is subject to immediate discharge. In the case of Storozhenko, the "immediate" discharge lasted from the end of February until 28 April. It was not until 19 May that the military procuracy of St. Petersburg Garrison terminated the criminal case with respect to Storozhenko, who did not want to hang himself....

The case of Yuriy Storozhenko raised a stir with "Soldiers' Mothers" precisely because of the unfortunate letter of Colonel of Justice V. Markov, military prosecutor of the city garrison, to the city prosecutor V. Yermenko. In particular, the public organization was accused of sheltering servicemen from justice who had been charged with crimes. In the opinion of the military procuracy, the case of Yuriy Storozhenko is a "typical example of the illegal activity of the committee."

But still, the most remarkable passage in this letter is about a forensic opinion (you involuntarily began to doubt the legal competence of military jurists): "In addition, at the urging of the committee, such persons are often sent to various so-called independent forensic and psychiatric commissions and to other investigations in civilian medical institutions, which is **not at all foreseen by existing legislation**. At the same time, a significant amount of money is collected from those being examined and from their parents, even though the conclusions **have no juridical force whatsoever**" (emphasis mine—Ye.S.).

In any event, we inform you that such a right of servicemen to appeal to civilian medical personnel is set forth in the "Bases of Legislation of the Russian Federation on the Preservation of the Health of Citizens." I particularly recommend that you pay attention to the last two paragraphs of Article 51 and that you study all of Article 53. This is precisely what "does not exist," in the opinion of military jurists. By the way, if I were in the military's place, I would also very carefully study articles 66 (bases for the compensation of harm done to the health of citizens) and 67 (compensation for losses arising in the provision of medical assistance to citizens suffering from illegal actions). It cannot be ruled out that they will soon run directly into this problem. Times have changed....

Ismaylovskiy Prospect, 8

It was precisely here, in the detached house of the former rayon party committee, where the organization "Soldiers' Mothers of St. Petersburg" found a shelter for itself. People who just recently themselves came to "Soldiers' Mothers" for help are now working here. Today they are helping others. One of the new ones is Natasha, the sister Alesha K-o. Oh, how far Aleksey still is from the resolution of his fate. For the time being, he is in hiding. But he has already undergone a medical examination.

FROM THE HISTORY OF THE SICKNESS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY. A.V. K-o, born 1973. He was called up to active service on 11 March 1994. At the present time, he is accused of desertion.

TESTIMONY. From the statement of Aleksey: On 12 May 1994, I abandoned the location of Military Unit 78628 in Murmansk in connection with repeated unauthorized interrelations with Private A. Gedafov. He hit me where it hurts most and in the most vulnerable places (kidneys, temples, ears, solar plexus, groin, chest, shins, and liver) and made me do pushups and pullups. This was seen by privates Abramovskiy, Vasilyev, Mamveyev, and Selikhov but they just encouraged him, because all of them were in an intoxicated state.

I could not tolerate this and so I left the unit. After that I tried to get home. On 19 May, I got on board the train from Murmansk to St. Petersburg in Olenegorsk. On that train, I was arrested by a police detail and they took me to the station in Loukhi, where they turned me over to the military unit. From there they were taking me to the stockade in Velomorsk accompanied by a lieutenant. On the way, he told me terrifying things. He promised that there they would teach me to serve and I would find out what real beatings are. I was very frightened and in my state of shock I jumped from the train. I lay unconscious on the causeway for several hours (the lieutenant did not tell anyone that a soldier in his custody had jumped from a moving train—Ye.S.) and after that I was found by track inspectors.

During the night of the 20th to the 21st of May, they took me to the hospital in Kem. After that they moved me to the infirmary of the local military unit. On 16 July, they took me to the military hospital in Murmansk. In the hospital, I wrote an explanatory note to the military investigator Yu. Senyukov....

After my release from the hospital, they brought me back to the same unit. No measures were taken against my antagonists and they threatened me constantly, because my explanation was read to them as well....

One night, after drinking vodka, privates Lobanov, Lukyanov, and Belyakov got me up and began to "converse" with me. They hit me in the face and in the temples, the kicked me in the groin and kidneys, and they knocked the back of my hand against the wall.... They kept on saying that they could even kill me and would not suffer any

serious consequences. This went on for a month. On 5 September, after drinking, privates Lukyanov and Lobanov organized the next session. They hit me hard in the heart. I told them that this was hurting me but they laughed and hit me several more times in the heart. They forced me to perform oral sodomy on Private Lukyanov and they promised that the next time they would finish me off.

On 7 September, knowing that it was time for the next drinking bout in the barracks, I decided not to return there from work but instead to seek protection from the higher command in St. Petersburg. This time I went on foot, not using transportation so that they could not intercept me and bring me back to this unit. In Kem, I was able to get some money from an acquaintance from the hospital and on 22 September I contacted my parents....

Try to put yourself in the place of this 20-year-old boy. How long would you have lasted? He walked 550 km across the taiga in two weeks, eating berries and grass. He did all of this to protect his own life and dignity (Article 14 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR). But he is being hunted as a deserter and criminal (under Article 246 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR).

The investigators from Murmansk also came to St. Petersburg. They made a lot of noise at "Soldiers' Mothers" and visited Alesha's father at the plant where he works. They took up his personal file and told all of his fellow workers what a bad boy K-o is. His sister Natasha got a bruise. Captain Kolesnik, an investigator from Alesha's unit, showed up at their home. He came with a precinct policeman, who was so zealous that he tried to knock the door down and to conduct a search.... He finally hit the young woman in the face. Some conversation. When they left, the valiant hunters found Natasha's six-year-old daughter in the yard. And they interrogated her. After that the child was unable to sleep the whole night.

Immortal Hazing?

So where does all this barbarism come from? One gets the feeling that the Russian Army is an enormous branch of the cellars of the Marquis de Sade. Look how many military units I enumerated just in one district. Things are bad everywhere. And how many such districts are there in Russia?

How is the Ministry of Defense reacting to this problem? How is it trying to resolve the problem? Is it trying to resolve it?

"It is reacting very strongly," says Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Vishnyak, an officer in the education section of the staff of Leningrad Military District. "If there are any cases, they will be investigated and the guilty party will then be removed from his post with all the consequences ensuing from this. But look at what is happening in our schools and technical schools. From there this extremism

is coming to the army. But the psychology of the individual is formed in the early years rather than in the army. I think, however, that the situation has improved considerably in the last three years. There is less hazing."

"But what do you think, is it that the army cannot or does not want to eradicate hazing?" I ask Ella Polyakova.

"In my opinion, hazing is now an instrument of authority in the army. Many officers even think that if there is no hazing there will be no discipline either. Hazing is a system of relations. Whereas there were some tendencies or hopes for reform under Gorbachev, everything became much worse after the events in October of last year. The best officers, normal and thoughtful people, are being discharged from the army. The army is becoming more closed. And this is always a sign of decline...."

On 20 January 1994, according to documents presented by the organization "Soldiers' Mothers," the European Parliament passed a resolution on the violation of human rights in the draft and during the time of military service in the Russian Army. The report of the Human Rights Commission of the State Duma reported on this to the president and deputies. But it is still unclear what the Ministry of Defense thinks about this.

On the day of my departure from St. Petersburg, "Soldiers' Mothers" was holding its customary reception of citizens. People crowded together in two rooms until 10 in the evening. Two of them came up to Ella Mikhaylovna. They were "dedy" who "themselves do not beat anyone." And therefore they are beaten up. One of them had bandaged wrists. He had already slashed his veins.... And in his eyes, one could see tears, a look of persecution and pain, and the trust of a puppy....

P.S. At the end of November at the initiative and with the participation of members of the European Parliament, there is supposed to be a seminar in St. Petersburg on the theme of "Violations of Human Rights in the Russian Army." According to preliminary information, Minister of Defense of Russia Pavel Grachev intends to take part in this seminar.

[Boxed material]

Dossier of OBSHCAYA GAZETA

According to information from the Main Military Procuracy, there were 5,406 crimes committed in the armed forces in the first six months of this year. At the same time, it is difficult to determine the true picture of the crime situation in the forces, because commanders often conceal violations of the law. One out of four criminal acts is a major crime with the objective of material gain. One out of six is committed in a group. And one out of ten crimes occurs under the influence of alcohol or narcotics. There is an increase in premeditated murder, rape, and hooliganism. One out of five crimes has to do with theft, robbery, or an assault for the purpose of robbery. There is still a high level of violations of the law in connection with

unauthorized interrelations ("dedovshchina" [hazing])—25.9 percent of the total number. An increase in crime has been noted in the airborne troops, in which the airborne assault trooper Pavel Grachev is particularly interested.

In the first six months of this year, 1,087 people perished. And 34 of these unauthorized interrelations (mockery), 67 as the result of severe bodily injuries, and 150 committed suicide.

The sum of the embezzlements uncovered amounted to 5 billion rubles and 1,300 people were held materially responsible. They recovered 1.2 billion rubles from guilty persons. At the same time, criminal charges raised in 1993-94 against high-ranking generals—there are about 20 such cases—are being investigated very slowly or have been "frozen" entirely.

[Boxed material]

Civil Defense

Instructions for the Parents of Soldiers

Our consultant—"Soldiers' Mothers of St. Petersburg"

Your son ARBITRARILY LEFT his military unit. So as not to harm your son inadvertently, you should:

1. Not believe it when they threaten you with imprisonment under Article 246 (arbitrary abandonment of military service).
2. Not hide your son but you must appeal to the rayon military commissariat in writing. Register your petition at the office. Remember his registration number. In the petition, detail the circumstances that forced you son to leave his military unit.
3. IF THERE IS EVIDENCE OF A BEATING, you must obtain an assignment to a forensic-medical commission of experts in the rayon military commissariat or military procuracy. Obtain the conclusion of the experts and make a copy. Keep the original!
4. IF THERE IS A NEED FOR TREATMENT, you should ask the rayon military commissariat or military procuracy to issue an assignment to a polyclinic. If they refuse to do this for you, appeal to the oblast military commissariat or chairman of the oblast draft board for an assignment (in writing, registering the petition in the office).
5. DEFINITELY SEND A TELEGRAM TO THE MILITARY UNIT.
6. You must know that the right to transfer service members in compulsory service from one military district to another belongs to the military staffs of the armed forces.
7. The procuracy, commandant's office, rayon military commissariat, and oblast military commissariat do not deal with transfers.

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MILITARY POLICY

Col-Gen Vorobyev on Military Finances

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[Interview with Col-Gen Vasily Vasilyevich Vorobyev, chief of the Main Military Budget and Financing Directorate of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, by Lt Col Vasily Lavrenyuk, CHEST IMEYU correspondent; place and date not given: "We Are Not so Rich and Strong as To Economize on the Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Colonel-General Vasily Vasilyevich Vorobyev was born to a working-class family on 11 May 1946 in the village of Gidrotorf, Balakhinskii Rayon, Gorkii Oblast. He graduated from the Yaroslav Military School with distinction in the military finance specialty, and later the Military Faculty at the Moscow Finance Institute. He served in the Siberian and Far East military districts, the Southern Group of Forces, and in various positions from chief of a financial unit of a large unit headquarters to district finance service chief. From 1990 he was first deputy chief of the Central Finance Directorate of the Army and Navy. In 1991 he was appointed chief of the Central Finance Directorate and in 1992 chief of the Main Military Budget and Financing Directorate of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense. He is married and has two children.

It is not the first year that problems of financing state structures from an "empty public purse" have existed. But perhaps never before have they grown so acute as they have recently, particularly with respect to financing the defense complex and spending to maintain the Army and Navy.

The chief of the Main Military Budget and Financing Directorate of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, Colonel-General Vasily Vasilyevich Vorobyev, analyzes the situation that has developed in an interview with our correspondent, Lieutenant Colonel Vasily Lavrenyuk.

[Lavrenyuk] Vasily Vasilyevich, before meeting with you, I spoke with officers of one of the garrisons in the Moscow Military District and asked them to ask questions of the "chief finance officer" of the Army and Navy. Do you know what the typical questions were?

[Vorobyev] It would be interesting to know, what were they?

[Lavrenyuk] What is being done in the Ministry of Defense to ensure reliable protection of servicemen and their families? Will the Law on Status of Servicemen "work"? Do they know at the Main Military Budget and Financing Directorate that the pay and allowances of the majority of servicemen are too modest? If they do, what are they planning to do to improve the situation?

[Vorobyev] Certainly, we know well what kind of a situation our officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers are in today. During the just over two years that have passed since the formation of Russia's Army, in conditions of an exceptionally complex economic situation in the country, quite a few important decisions were made aimed at ensuring social protection of Army and Navy personnel, veterans of the armed forces, and their family members. Today we have the most effective system of material support of defenders of the homeland among the CIS member-states. Certain elements of this system, especially for organizing state personal insurance, evoke the respect of servicemen of developed western countries. Nevertheless, we understand well that the level of material support of servicemen remains low. Considering that the pay and allowances of a serviceman are often the only source of income for his entire family, many are having a hard time getting along.

[Lavrenyuk] Incidentally, for the sake of fairness, it must be said that it is not only the military who are having a hard time today... Many Russians are living below the poverty level today.

[Vorobyev] All this is true, but we are talking about "sovereign" people who are responsible for the country's peace and security. We are not so rich and strong as to economize today on the Army and on people who are ready at any minute to give their life for the homeland. People in the military often end up in the position of Cinderella, and at their expense they try to patch up the holes in the state pocket.

I will cite examples to back up my statement. It always was that a junior officer, say, a platoon commander, did not receive any less than an engineer in our country. But what about now? I do not want to take into consideration commercial structures which, by hook or by crook, "pump" income and pay "through the nose" for their employees. I will cite another example from the sphere of state enterprises. At one of the greenhouses near Moscow, a worker engaged in growing flowers receives three times as much as a strategic missile regiment commander. With all my respect for this worker (I myself worked as a cabinetmaker at a plant before enrolling in military school), you cannot compare or put on the same level his volume of work and his responsibility with the volume of work and, more importantly, the responsibility of a regiment commander.

Or take another example: a civil aviation pilot today receives 5-6 times more than a pilot of a supersonic jet aircraft. Is this really a normal phenomenon?

[Lavrenyuk] So, what is the matter? Why does the state find money for workers, civil aviation pilots, and miners, but does not always find it for the Army? Who personally makes the decision about financing of the Army? What is the mechanism of this action? How well-founded are officers' complaints about the Ministry of Defense and,

in particular, the Main Military Budget and Financing Directorate for slowness and delay in indexation of salaries?

[Vorobyev] Let us introduce some clarity. The Ministry of Defense itself, on its own initiative, cannot index, that is, increase pay and allowances.

The overall level of a serviceman's pay and allowances is determined, I make special emphasis of this, not by me personally, not by the minister of defense, nor even by the president, but by law.

[Lavrenyuk] You have in mind the Law on Status of Servicemen?

[Vorobyev] Yes, by Article 12, where it is established that pay for primary military appointments cannot be less than five times the minimum wage, and pay for military rank cannot be less than half military appointment pay. That is, it cannot be less than 7.5 times the minimum wage. This is primary pay. After that the calculation goes according to the rate scale.

[Lavrenyuk] That means we must "dance" away from the minimum wage in the country. It is increasing, and the pay for military is increasing automatically..

[Vorobyev] That is not entirely true. Pay does not increase automatically: it is established by the government of the Russian Federation on the recommendation of the Ministry of Defense. We always submit our calculations and proposals in a timely manner, and after that...

[Lavrenyuk] What happens after that depends on the president and the prime minister.

[Vorobyev] Formally, yes. Actually, of course, everything is "tied" to the economy. Due to the country's complicated financial situation, the government sometimes makes the decision on indexation of servicemen's pay and allowances with a delay of 1-2 months, by which a new minimum wage is introduced. This results in many servicemen quite justifiably appealing to various levels concerning violation of Article 12 of the Russian Federation Law on Status of Servicemen.

[Lavrenyuk] Judging by official prognoses of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economics, the "light at the end of the tunnel" will glimmer in late 1995, at best. As it turns out, is there any point in the military counting on a considerable increase in the standard of living before this time?

[Vorobyev] On the large score, yes. The Army, let us not harbor illusions, will be able to get out of the "lack of money" impasse only together with industry, agriculture and, in general, together with the country.

Although this does not at all mean that the most critical problems of social protection of the Army cannot be weakened already today or tomorrow. We must learn to

work in the new conditions, react in a timely manner to difficulties that arise, and resolve them.


[Lavrenyuk] A question in this regard: With what is the wave of delays in payment of pay and allowances by finance bodies of the Army and Navy to officers and warrant officers associated? Not only are they paid modest pay by today's standards, it is also impossible to get paid on time.

[Vorobyev] Again, I must explain. The Ministry of Defense does not print its own money. We distribute and spend only what the Ministry of Finance gives us. And it allocates far from those amounts which are minimally necessary to satisfy the urgent requirements of the troops and naval forces. Financing is done in small portions, a drop at a time. The Army is not even allocated what it is unquestionably due in accordance with decisions adopted by the president or the State Duma. Attempts by the Ministry of Finance to allocate appropriations only for pay and allowances also cannot correct the situation, since we cannot stop life, and part of the funds allocated for payment of pay and allowances, even under the strictest prohibitions, will be spent for other purposes. Here are a few examples. Young replacements were called up and had to be transported at least to the military unit. No one does this now without payment in advance. Nuclear munitions requiring periodic technical servicing or salvaging also will not wait for allocation of funds for their transport by rail to the appropriate places. In the provinces, commanders frequently have to "put out fires" with money intended for payment of pay and allowances when bakeries refuse to give out bread on loan. Money is constantly needed to pay for communications, electrical power, food, and for maintaining nurseries and medical institutions. You see, things have gotten to the point that local authorities near Moscow (Leningrad Housing Services Unit), for example, and in Moscow (military polyclinic at Lefortovo) are shutting off electrical power, water, and gas to military garrisons, apartment houses, and barracks due to late payment for them. Even command posts were threatened with being disconnected. Money is needed to purchase coal and fuel in remote garrisons of the Far East and Far North: some of these garrisons had only 10-12 days of coal left this winter. Suppliers have refused to deliver fuel without prepayment for any kind of guarantees whatsoever. Despite the fact that women and children in the garrisons could have ended up in a critical situation... Everyone requires money before delivering raw materials or commodities. In short, the market does not believe in tears.

[Lavrenyuk] How are you getting out of the situation?

[Vorobyev] We are trying to manipulate the modest monetary resources. Above all, we are directing them where the situation is particularly complicated and duty conditions are difficult. We are patching things up...

[Lavrenyuk] Many do not know about this; hence rumors, conjectures, and the most fantastic suppositions arise, including about a "military-finance" mafia.



[Vorobyev] Facts are needed before making such grave accusations. And there are none. There are cases of mismanagement, confusion, lack of diligence—we know about them and do not hide them. The parties responsible are strictly punished. We treat especially harshly finance workers whose duty it is to ensure observance of state finance discipline but who violate our laws. But the fact that someone, as they say, “specially” twirls officer money in commercial structures and has dividends from this—hence the delays in payment of “pay and allowances”—these are all unfounded and totally unconfirmed assertions.

[Lavrenyuk] Vasily Vasilyevich, let us digress a little from the problems of today and go back in history. The opinion exists that an officer in Russia, unlike the armies of western countries, has always experienced material difficulties. In the tsarist Army, for example. Is this a distinctive feature of our country (we have always had a large and “cheap” army) or the result of weakness of the economy or inertness of leaders?

[Vorobyev] I would not agree with these opinions. In Russia, the level of material protection of the defender of the homeland has traditionally been fairly high. Of course, everyone has always wanted more. For example, I once caught sight of a document in which one lieutenant complained to command authorities about the difficult living conditions and the shortage of “rent” money. This is a timely topic today, too, is it not? But at that time the officer complained that for the money allocated to him he could not rent housing with two bedrooms, a study, a dining room, and a cluster of additional rooms...

If one tries to analyze how officers and generals of the tsarist Army looked according to the level of material well-being against the background of other sections and

classes of society and what they could buy with their pay and allowances, a curious picture is received.

The monthly salary of generals and officers of the tsarist Army (1909-1912) was, for example, 775 rubles [R] for a full general and R70 for a lieutenant. The average wage of a worker in 1912 was just over R20 per month.

An Army lieutenant could, for example, use his monthly pay to purchase more than 230 kg of meat (at the highest price of 33 kopecks per kg). The pay of officers in western armies is quite decent. For example, a company commander in the FRG receives 5,000 marks, in the United States (with 10 years of service) \$2,772, and in France 12,796 francs plus 4,000-6,000 francs in various compensations.

One certainly should demonstrate caution when comparing the well-being of armed forces personnel today with the incomes of our predecessors and particularly with the level of material support of servicemen of foreign armies. Not everything here is plain and simple.

The high pay and allowances being received, as a rule, do not solve all the problems of servicemen in the West. Every officer having a motor vehicle still does not indicate that he is fabulously rich and completely protected from all misfortunes. In the majority of countries of the world, apartments are not provided free of charge to servicemen; it is necessary to lay out up to one-third of pay and allowances to rent an apartment. Far from everyone can purchase their own housing. Many officers accumulate money for a whole year to go on leave. In France, generals and officers often leave Paris after finishing service, since it is cheaper to live in the provinces.

Any objective observer would agree with me that in recent years Russia's Ministry of Defense has done more

in terms of social protection of servicemen than during the decades in recent former times when social policy came down to periodic additions of R10-20 to salary. Fundamental decisions have been made which, in essence, reform the entire earlier-existing system of financing the armed forces and pay and allowances for servicemen. Five or six years ago we could only dream, for example, that a serviceman could travel on leave from Kamchatka to the mainland with his family at the state's expense. Today this is a reality...

[Lavrenyuk] This probably involves the unprecedented reorientation of the military budget toward the social sphere?

[Vorobyev] The proportion of expenditures for upkeep of the Army and Navy and for the social sphere has been steadily growing since 1989. Whereas in 1988 it was 25 percent, in 1993 it was 58 percent. At the same time, the percentage of expenditures for the purchase of arms and scientific research work on military subject matter tended to decrease from 44 to 15 and from 19 to 6 percent, respectively.

This year, according to our estimates, expenditures for paying pay and allowances to servicemen, wages to civilian personnel, payment of food and pensions, housing construction, and maintaining hospitals, polyclinics, sanatoria, rest homes, and kindergartens account for up to 62 percent of the military budget.

Expenditures for payment of armament and equipment, of which expenditures associated with satisfying the social needs of workers employed in the defense complex account for about 45 percent, also bear a social orientation to a certain degree.

Here is another example. Pay and allowances of servicemen increased nine times from January 1992 through June 1994 (four times in 1992, three times in 1993, and two times through June 1994).

[Lavrenyuk] Nevertheless, a paradox results: the more decisively and farther "structural finance perestroika" proceeds, the lower servicemen's standard of living becomes...

[Vorobyev] Of course, the steps taken could not solve the social problems of servicemen fully. Inflation is quickly "eating up" the pay raises of officers; in some sectors of industry, wages are being increased more quickly than in the budget sphere.

As far as figures of 60 percent of the military budget for the social sphere is concerned, as they say, it is far more... We have already reduced to a critical minimum the purchase of combat equipment and armament and expenditures for combat training. This year we even had to abandon conducting divisional and regimental exercises due to saving of funds. To this same end, travel by generals and officers of the central staff to the troops on inspections has been sharply limited, and the number of assemblies being conducted has been decreased.

Add to this the fact that we cannot turn down the significant expenditures associated with supporting the emergency situation in "hot spots" and peacekeeping activities within the former USSR.

[Lavrenyuk] The main argument of your opponents, particularly from the Ministry of Finance, against increasing pay and allowances of servicemen and others financed by the budget is usually that it spurs a new round of inflation. Politicians often advise the military to find funds for the social sphere by "structuring" the armed forces and reducing military units which today are understrength.

[Vorobyev] In my view, such arguments are an attempt to pull out into the blessed light and breathe new life into the rather dilapidated idea of solving the country's economic problems at the expense of the military. The idea is illusory and, I even would say, harmful. During the last five years, the military budget (defense spending) has been cut in half in comparable prices. What, have we begun to live better?


And then we must not forget that a decrease in the defense budget this year adversely affects the financial situation of 33 subjects of the Russian Federation. For example, one enterprise of the military-industrial complex "supports" the population of an area exceeding by 5-10 times the number of workers at the enterprise. The expenditures of enterprises for the social sphere amount to up to 30 percent of the cost of military equipment and arms for the Russian Army.

But this is how it is. As far as the often heard advice about speeding up reforms in the armed forces is concerned, structural restructuring and reduction of the Army are under way, and this is not the first year. The Air Force, for example, has already been reduced 20 percent. Submarines, surface ships, and cutters that have become obsolete and lost their effectiveness are being decommissioned from the Navy.

But everything is not so simple here. Funds are needed for reducing the armed forces and salvaging weapons and combat equipment, and considerable funds at that. Thus, about 1,500 seamen are serving on decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines of the Northern Fleet. After all, you cannot leave the reactors unsupervised.

According to international treaties signed by Russia, 40,000 tonnes of chemical weapons are to be destroyed, but not a single kopeck has been allocated for this yet. Considerable money is also needed to pay service gratuity to officers being discharged due to the reduction and to pay for shipping their family and property to their chosen place of residence.

Regarding the assertion that increasing pay and allowances for servicemen leads to a new round of inflation every time, it is exaggerated, to put it mildly. Servicemen comprise barely one percent of the population of Russia. It is easier for the Ministry of Finance, it seems, to take



a swipe at the pockets of the disciplined military than it is to get taxes from commercial structures and replenish the revenue part of the state budget from other sources.

[Lavrenyuk] If you believe statistics, the majority of the population is in a disastrous situation. Nevertheless, the real standard of living of blue- and white-collar workers is higher than that calculated by the Russian Federation State Committee for Statistics. It does not take into account the fact that many now hold two jobs and engage in commerce. Why are military prohibited from holding two jobs, especially since the state cannot ensure a fitting life?

[Vorobyev] Indeed, according to Article 10 of the Russian Federation Law on Status of Servicemen, servicemen do not have the right to combine military service with work at enterprises, institutions, or organizations. True, there is an exception for jobs in science, teaching, and creative activities if it does not interfere with performance of military duties.

Restrictions in the rights of servicemen, including the ban on commerce, in my view, are fully justified. The specific nature of military labor and army service requires great moral and physical efforts. Here we must define "either-or." Either you give all of yourself to the service, or you leave and take up a different job.

Incidentally, the amount of pay and allowances is important and perhaps the main, but I emphasize not the only, component of social protection of a serviceman. He is granted—as a sort of compensation for the restricting of general civilian rights and freedoms caused by the specific nature of military service—a number of privileges, guarantees, and compensations. He is exempt from paying taxes and has the right to free rations, benefits on payment of municipal services, travel, pensions, and payment of a one-time benefit in the event of discharge.

[Lavrenyuk] These and other benefits are provided for by the Law on Status of Servicemen which, alas, due to the state's shortage of funds, is operating at half-strength, at best. What would you say about the proposal now in great vogue to develop and implement a concept of address social support of servicemen who are in the most disastrous situation? As an "addition" to the law?

[Vorobyev] We have been implementing in practice for several years now that which you call a concept which must be developed and implemented. It is worth analyzing the documents and measures adopted by the Ministry of Defense in the social sphere in order to note a stable trend: above all, we are trying to support materially those servicemen who are carrying out a combat mission and performing duty in extreme and special conditions, in "hot spots," in remote areas, and in areas with severe climate conditions. I can say that this work to improve the system of pay and allowances of officers and warrant officers adequate for these conditions will continue in the future.

You will agree, we must not place in identical material conditions a lieutenant who is serving in Moscow or St. Petersburg and, say, at a high-mountain air defense point where it is impossible for his wife to find a job, where everything must be purchased at three times the cost, and where everything is imported...

Or take officers and servicemen who are without apartments and are forced to relocate to unprepared areas. We are also trying to provide them—to the extent we are able—priority address assistance. Although, of course, ideally it should be like this: the government establishes and then financially and materially reinforces the list of minimum social conditions, without the creation of which it is prohibited to accomplish measures for the reduction and relocation of troops.

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For the time being, the reality is such that the most wonderful plans are coming up against a dead end of a lack of money. For example, due to bad financing of housing construction (on this point, there exists a number of decrees of the Russian Federation government and even a decree of the Russian Federation president) last year, the plan for housing construction for servicemen actually failed. And the situation is not any better this year...

And look at how the funds are being used that are specially allocated to the regions for construction of housing for those being discharged from military service. Local authorities are striving to use this money to solve their problems, for example, developing main engineering networks and city infrastructure. It seems the money has been spent, but there is no housing for the military.

Thus, last year we managed to commission 71 percent of the planned housing in Sverdlovsk Oblast, 69 percent in St. Petersburg, and 60 percent in Moscow; at the same time, only 2 percent of the apartments anticipated for the year have been built in Novgorod and Amur oblasts, 5 percent in Pskov and Kostroma oblasts, and 6 percent in Tversk and Kaliningrad oblasts.

[Lavrenyuk] Maybe this money should not be dispersed over regions, but would be better to be allocated in a centralized manner to the Ministry of Defense, and it, as the client, would find subcontractors. Then every single ruble will be spent on construction of housing for servicemen and not for development of the infrastructure of a city or village...

[Vorobyev] Back in the stage of studying this matter, we insisted that the money be given to the Ministry of Defense. They are our people, we discharge them, and we must build or pay for housing for them. However, a different decision was made. The result, it can be said, was nothing to rave about.

I would like to continue the topic of specifically addressed social assistance to servicemen. Several years ago, the armed forces adopted a system of paying various monetary awards to servicemen, stimulating the conditions and specific nature of their military service. Depending upon the type and duration of alert duty, for example, officers and warrant officers receive an "increase" of 15 to 25 percent of their pay for appointment.

For the first time, beginning in 1990, payment of a monetary for class qualification was established for officer personnel and for medical officers for a qualification category. This is approximately 7 to 10 percent of the pay for appointment.

Level of Pay for Certain Professions as of 15 June 1994*
(in thousands of rubles)

| | |
|---|-------------|
| Lawyer | 600-5,000 |
| Civil Aviation aircraft commander (Sheremetyevo-2) | 3,000 |
| Commercial bank chief accountant | 2,000-3,000 |
| Commercial firm finance director | 1,500-3,000 |
| Currency dealer | 2,000-3,000 |
| Insurance agent | 800-2,500 |
| Secretary-assistant | 350-1,200 |
| Interpreter | 600-1,000 |
| Blast furnace steelworker | 500-1,000 |
| Cabinetmaker | 600-1,000 |
| Commercial bank bookkeeper | 800-900 |
| Bus driver | 600-900 |
| Excavator operator | 750-900 |
| Construction worker | 600-900 |
| Crane operator | 700-800 |
| Category E truck driver | 500-800 |
| Gas-electric welder | 300-600 |

*According to data of the Agency for Job Placement "TRIZA" and personnel services of enterprises.

By decision of the Russian Federation government, in March 1992 a single procedure was established for paying monetary awards to officers and warrant officers, as well as servicemen performing military service under contract in positions of soldiers, sailors, noncommissioned officers, and petty officers in a percentage of pay for appointment. As a result of periodic indexation of pay for appointment conducted in connection with inflation, the amount of these awards increases.

We have also worked to improve other supplemental payments to servicemen which at one time by decisions of the Union government were established in absolute amounts or in percentage of pay for appointment with maximum limits. For example, limits have been repealed on payment of sea pay, which now is 30 percent (for domestic cruises) and 50 percent of pay for appointment (for foreign cruises) and does not have a maximum amount.

Compensation has been established for parachute jumps and diving in percentage of minimum pay for a primary officer position of platoon commander. Now these amounts are significant and are from 4 to 20 percent of pay. Quite recently, there was a decision to increase payments to those who are engaged in mineclearing and ordnance disposal.

[Lavrenyuk] Do you believe that this system of additional payments and compensation has proven worthwhile?

[Vorobyev] It is an obvious fact that measures to improve the military pay system have proven worthwhile. It is another matter that it needs to be improved further, but again everything runs into the shortage of funds being allocated to us from the federal budget.

In our view, the existing amounts of compensation are still poorly stimulating an increase in class qualification. Payments for renting private housing are extremely insufficient. Really, can you rent an apartment today for several thousand rubles?

[Lavrenyuk] In conditions in which the state is not in a position to ensure a high standard of living and reliable social protection for officers and warrant officers, how can it implement costly measures to switch to a professional basis and recruit "contract" servicemen? In your view, is the Ministry of Defense ready for a professional Army from the financial standpoint?

[Vorobyev] We have a fairly clear and definite position on these questions. The system of manning the armed forces that exists today makes it possible with minimum possible expenditures to ensure that the country's defense capabilities are at the proper level and to create the mobilization resources necessary for wartime. Calculations conducted at the Ministry of Defense show that even with a reduction of the Army and its conversion to the all-volunteer principle of manning, expenditures for paying personnel will increase considerably. Above all, this is associated with additional large expenditures for pay and allowances of privates and noncommissioned officers and the increase in pay and allowances for officers and warrant officers. Expenditures for creating the social sphere of a professional Army will increase.

But this does not mean that we are fundamental opponents to a professional Army. The transition to it must be accomplished in stages, after carefully studying and weighing all the pros and cons... Such experience is already now being amassed and, it must be said, is not always favorable. All the same, it is premature at this stage of military reform to talk about transition to a professional Army both from the organizational and economic standpoints.

[Lavrenyuk] Vasily Vasilyevich, it is certainly not possible to talk about the financial aspect of social protection of servicemen today without mentioning compulsory state insurance of soldiers and officers and various non-budget funds...

[Vorobyev] You have touched upon a very important and topical problem. The functions of compulsory state insurance of servicemen have been entrusted to the Military Insurance Company [VSK] by decision of the government. It operates under the patronage of the Ministry of Defense and, in essence, performs that work

which at one time was done by the Main Administration of State Insurance [Gosstrakh] before the collapse of the Soviet Union. But it does so only in the Army and Navy.

The VSK pays out insurance amounts in the event of the death, wounding, or injury of a servicemen or the onset of a disability. Incidentally, the company's functions are not limited just to paying out insurance. It is learning to earn money and effectively use it in the interests of people in uniform. The VSK has already developed a whole series of various types of insurance, and not just for servicemen but also for other Russians: insurance for personal property, freight, aircraft, ship, and economic transactions. The company conducts active charitable activities. Thus, last year, more than R1 billion were spent on purchasing housing for Afghan veterans (35 apartments were acquired), and assistance was given to invalids of the war in Afghanistan. Another R1 billion were sent to the districts and fleets to provide assistance to the most needy categories of servicemen locally by decision of commanders: large families and officers without apartments.

The Military Insurance Company, incidentally, provides us the lion's share of revenue into the non-budget fund, which was created recently by decision of the minister of defense in our Main Military Budget and Financing Directorate. It consists of two parts. The first is at the disposal of the minister of defense; the second is at the disposal of commanders of the services and branches of troops.

[Lavrenyuk] Approximately what is the ratio of these parts?

[Vorobyev] Presently, the entire fund amounts to R2 billion. We leave R500 million in Moscow and transfer the remaining R1.5 billion to the troops. The district commanders use this money as they see fit, so to speak, in unusual situations: for example, if they have to provide emergency assistance to a seriously ill serviceman or family member and there is no corresponding expenditure item for state funds for paid treatment.

In addition—and this is quite important—we are striving to create the material prerequisites for reviving the best traditions of the Russian Army. The officer collective has always been famous for its cohesiveness; everyone lived as one large regimental family. The celebrated important events together, rested together, and helped one another. But money was needed for all this. How did we get out of this situation recently? We "passed the hat" and collected money for organizing anniversary celebrations, buying gifts, souvenirs, and flowers for veterans and distinguished officers, and conducting military-patriotic and cultural measures. Now it is possible to use money from the non-budget fund for these purposes. And this is just one example.

[Lavrenyuk] Vasily Vasilyevich, a new stage of privatization has begun in the country—the transition from a

system of free distribution of property to its real sale, from absolute privatization to privatization conditioned by additional investments. Alas, servicemen have been left, figuratively speaking, overboard in privatization. Is this really fair?

[Vorobyev] Indeed, servicemen now, in the new conditions of privatization, virtually have no opportunity to participate actively in the distribution of state property. When conducting the auction sale of industrial and other installations, they cannot act as small or larger investors and do not have the ability to participate in business activities. Benefits have not been provided for officers and warrant officers in conducting "monetary" privatization.

What can be said concerning this? Of course, this is not a normal situation. If a person does not have the right to receive his share of state and municipal property, he should be granted some kind of compensation for this. This is something that both our legislators and executive power have to work on.

[Lavrenyuk] It is not necessary to reinvent the wheel each time, as they say, in resolving problems of social protection of servicemen. It is worth looking closely at the experience of neighboring and more distant countries. It is interesting to know, how is social protection of servicemen ensured in the armies of the United States, France, and Germany? What can we borrow from their experience?

[Vorobyev] In western countries, they are well aware that many factors influence the attractiveness of military service, including the size of pay and allowances. Everything is done to see that soldiers and noncommissioned officers willingly extend their contracts. In Great Britain, for example, they believe that the interests of servicemen and the taxpayers are best served by a wage system for servicemen that has at its basis comparability of a serviceman's pay and allowances with the wages of an equivalent civilian.

The comparison is made annually, and adjustments to pay and allowances are made immediately. Thus, according to our data, in 1992 the pay and allowances of servicemen increased nine percent compared to the previous year.

In Poland, for example, there is a somewhat different system. There the pay and allowances of servicemen—the general level—are determined by law as a multiple of the average wage of workers in the material production sphere (industry, construction, transportation, communications, and trade). This coefficient is determined by order of the president of the Polish Republic. Presently, it is 1.7 times the average wage of workers in the material production sphere.

In the Armed Forces of India, pay and allowances are set at a level exceeding two-thirds the salary of state employees.

When drawing up legislative acts on pensions and social protection of servicemen of the Russian Armed Forces, the basic provisions of legislation on these matters of developed western countries (United States, Germany, France, and others) were studied. A number of provisions (in particular, with respect to insurance of servicemen and the right to a pension for long service) have been taken into account in the corresponding legislative acts of the Russian Federation and in conformity with the country's economic capabilities. So, we do not at all intend to reinvent the wheel, although, of course, we need to take into account the specific nature, history, and peculiarities of Russia.

[Lavrenyuk] A final question: How do you see the future? What will be the level of social protection of servicemen, and will it occupy a worthy place according to level of prosperity in society?

[Vorobyev] I look at the future with optimism. We absolutely will become richer and stronger. All the prerequisites for this are there. Today's concerns, problems, and material difficulties of servicemen will be remembered as an unpleasant, but probably inevitable stage in our journey to prosperity and success. It is a stage which we must pass through with dignity and honor, with a clear awareness of our goals and tasks.

[Lavrenyuk] Thank you for the interview and attention to our journal and our readers.

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Gen Lebed on Defense Budget, Army Reform

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[Article by Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed under the rubric "Position": "Russia Has the Army, but Is It an Army? On the Defense Budget, Military Reform, and the State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This article does not at all purport, and cannot purport, to be the ultimate truth. This is an invitation to a dialogue. We cannot live the way we live now. But how can we live? How should we? We can only answer these questions by activating our collective reason. And not on a world scale but our own, domestic scale. Does it exist? Yes. But for a number of reasons, mainly of a subjective nature, no more than 10 percent of its potential is realized. What causes our reason to turn off? The extreme situation. It is obvious. We are facing the real threat of disintegration of the armed forces. Why? The current budget appropriations for defense are, on one hand, considerably lower than the floor of the armed forces' needs, and on the other, they are mind-boggling high. Paradoxical as it is, it is a fact. Budget appropriations for defense in 1995 are planned in the amount of R45 trillion, which is somewhat more than this year, but if the current rate of inflation persists (and I do not see any particular grounds for optimism),

we can say, without burdening ourselves with super-precise calculations, that real defense expenditures will shrink by a factor of two, or maybe more. And then what? The paralyzed-demoralized remains of a victorious army? The solution lies in immediate reform of the armed forces, in creating a situation where success will be determined not by the number of trillions appropriated but the skill in making them work. The task of collective reason is to forestall the collapse, to stop the runaway military chariot on the brink of the abyss. But first about what we see.

The military is an institute of the state, and as such it cannot reform itself. This is something for the state, and only the state, to do. Where did the attempt to place this impossible task on the military lead us? To a decision to shape the Russian army in the image and likeness of the Soviet army. The emphasis was made on the "fastest possible" withdrawal of troops, that is, their transfer from the first- and second-line strategic echelons to the third, to an unprepared infrastructure. At the same time, what is being passed for reforms are planned (and often unplanned) organizational and personnel measures, a transition to a new method of manning (which was done out of great anguish), introducing new uniforms, and so on. Within an insanely short period of time Russia found itself oversaturated with poorly manned, and practically not supported, "re nainders" of divisions, regiments, brigades, and hastily organized munitions warehouses, which present a daily threat of turning the area of their placement into an ecological disaster area with consequences that are difficult to estimate. This, in turn, has led to the unsolvability of matters of placement, as well as supply of fuel and energy sources. The result: the absence of planned combat training. The result: demoralized personnel and increased manifestations of crime. And in the final analysis: a sharp decline in the fighting fitness of individual formations and units and in the combat readiness of the armed forces as a whole.

We do have the military—but is it an army? Having asked this question, it is very important not to succumb to the temptation to hide our heads in the sand and start flicking off the feathers from the ostensibly insulted honor of the uniform. The situation should be perceived the way it is, not the way we would like it to be. Against the backdrop of the current state of affairs, let us ask a few questions and try to answer them.

If we leave everything as is, that is, let the immensely huge organism decompose, will the state come out of it without paying a price? No.

Does society know of the colossal problems that exist in the military, and correspondingly, of the colossal efforts that will be required to solve these problems? No.

Do both branches of authority—legislative and executive—possess to a full extent information on the situation in the military? No.

Does the Russian Federation possess superiority in manpower and equipment over at least one element in the NATO—China—Islamic world triad? No.

Are Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan the states hostile to the Russian Federation, and does it make sense to maintain full-scale groups of forces on our borders with them? No.

Is it possible altogether, finally, and is it necessary to be equally strong everywhere? No.

Do we need highly professionally trained mobile forces in such a situation? Yes.

What should they consist of, in addition to airborne troops? We can figure it out.

But do we have the necessary quantity of military-transport aviation planes and helicopters to quickly deploy mobile forces? No.

Are the budget appropriations commensurate with the armed forces' needs? No.

Can we hope that they will be substantially increased? No.

Has "great power" Russia identified its foreign policy priorities, the scope of vitally important interests it will protect with all the means at its disposal? No.

And now back to the reform. What is it? Military reform is a system of measures financed by the state whose purpose is to bring military policy in line with the economic abilities of the state (the "I want—I can" dimension) and vitally important (first and foremost foreign policy) interests.

Perhaps this formula is not indisputable. But let us accept it as a basis. While not wishing in any way to demean the national political leadership, it should be noted that we cannot expect in the near foreseeable future something complete in the area of formulating "national interests." First, this is a colossal undertaking by itself; second, we still do not have a well-rounded system of views on the national interests of the Russian Federation; and third, the Russian Federation as an object for which security is to be ensured is in a state of unstable flux. Yes, we will not be able yet to do it to a full extent; however, we may assume with a high degree of probability that at least priority interests and goals already have been formulated but not yet made public—I have no doubt of this. And the rest is relatively simple: Just follow the chain: national interests—threats to interests (real and potential)—forces and means of countering the threat—budget appropriations for the maintenance of forces and means—military policy whose purpose is to ensure sensible use of appropriations in the interests of maintaining the national defense capabilities at a satisfactory level. We have come full circle. To where? The budget. Let us talk about it in more detail.

About 15 years ago for the overwhelming majority of military servicemen the military budget meant one figure—R17.2 (+0.1) billion. This figure hung in a prominent place in all Lenin rooms; we were proud of it ourselves and urged the soldiers to be proud of it—we

had the smallest military budget in the world (or almost the smallest). And if at the same time some combine-and-tractor plant produced one tractor on the right and three tanks on the left—and it was, naturally, the minister of agriculture who paid for it—this was considered the pinnacle of state wisdom and military cunning. Has the situation changed since then? It has, but not substantially. The seemingly monolithic figure disintegrated into approximately 10 smaller figures, the main among which are the amounts appropriated for porridge, for pants, for R&D, for housing construction, for pensions. And what? With such a general approach it frequently transpires that there is still not enough porridge somewhere on Russkiy Island; that in some places one can see ragged men, evidence of a shortage of pants; that cash pay is issued irregularly; and that pensions are in trouble. I dare say that until the military budget is broken down by service and even category of troops, to an individual weapons program; until we figure out what we need to buy today, what tomorrow, what in two or three years, and what we should not be spending money on altogether, we will not be able to match great power interests with economic capabilities. I dare say that neither is this going to happen if we vaguely know the amount of budget appropriations for only one year ahead. We need to know at a minimum five years ahead. This is one of the cornerstone conditions, one of the most important starting points for planning a military reform. I dare say that until protected line items determined on the basis of state priorities are clearly defined and guaranteed by the authority of the state in the military budget, again, nothing, or almost nothing, will come out of it. The necessity to take outside the military budget and formalize as independent state programs such expense line items as, for instance, social rehabilitation of soldiers-participants in numerous "international" conflicts; conversion; fulfillment of international obligations in the area of reductions and elimination of weapons; and improving young people's health is long overdue.

It is time to understand that people who return from war are people without phobias. They have stepped over the line a person should not step over. They were sent to war by the state, and it is simpler, and most importantly, considerably cheaper to help them to adapt in society than later simply throw enormous amounts of money into law enforcement organs in order to largely fruitlessly deal with them. I was very young, but probably because of this I remember very well how drunken former soldiers disabled in the Great Patriotic War fought at a farmers market. Ruthlessly, cruelly, skillfully. To the death. Fear the man who has sacrificed his health on the altar of the motherland and for this was consigned by the motherland to become an outcast.

It is time to finally realize that the defense complex of the Russian Federation is the only major production center whose technological level was on par with or even higher than that of other countries. Investment resources were realized in a unique way in the defense industry, and because of this only military production sustains the

core of high technology in Russia. Destroy this core, and the trend of Russia turning into a raw materials appendix of the world market will become irreversible. Conversion must be smart.

It is time to understand that if a certain number of submarines that have reached the end of their useful life, with undismantled nuclear reactors, are tied to a certain pier of the Northern Fleet, and the Ministry of Defense in its poverty is today unable to find the billions for their proper dismantling, tomorrow the state will have to look for tens or hundreds of trillions to clean up the consequences of accidents involving them. Only a miser and a fool pay twice. This is in theory—in practice it is much more.

It is time to understand that when, according to statistics, only one in five draftees is healthy, the army automatically turns into an infirmary. What kind of service can you count on under such circumstances?

Why does the budget consist of only expense items? Why not count potential revenue? Why such modesty and false incompetence? Commercial activities are banned in the military. This is fair and right. The military is a temple, and the Holy Testament tells us that people trading in the temple should be kicked out. But, first, there nevertheless are traders—how they manage to bypass the law and the Ministry of Defense's orders is another matter, but they are there. What happens to the fruit of their energetic activities is quite unclear, and it would not be a bad idea to sort out this murky issue by putting everything on a scientific state basis. Second, such an attempt—to put it on such basis—seemingly has been implemented. There is, for instance, such an organization as the TsUMR i VED—the Center for the Management of Material Resources and Foreign Economic Activities.

This is a quasi-military organization. Its mode of activity: The commanding fathers together with respective service chiefs identify equipment that has served its term or been in storage for a long time, transfer it to TsUMR, which sells it, dutifully putting the money into the state's pocket, while the happy state uses this money to build housing for retired officers, pays pensions, and so on. The theory is correct in itself; the practice, however, on the example of the formation under my command, is this. Equipment that has been in storage for 12-15 or more years is offered for sale. The equipment itself is not bad, but precisely because it had not been used for so long, various washers, gaskets, and other parts have failed fully or partially due to natural aging. And objectively with every passing month and year the equipment's technical condition deteriorates and requires increasingly greater expenditures to bring it into saleable shape. Or, graphically, the technical condition curve is steadily sloping down. At the same time, because of inflation, the equipment's price jumps on average 1.4 times per quarter. Or, graphically, the price curve is steadily rising up. Or, taken all together, with each

passing quarter one has to pay increasingly more money for equipment with steadily declining parameters. As a result, most potential buyers blink and leave. Thus, the result is that today we can get, theoretically speaking, R2 million for a piece of equipment, tomorrow—R1 million, and the day after tomorrow scrap it for R100,000, or under certain circumstances simply leave it on a dump and pay a hefty fine for ecological violations. He who wants a lot gets a little. Who benefits from this? Who is supposed to study market conditions—the commanders or the TsUMR? Or are we so smart that we do not need to? But if we are so smart, why are we so poor?

I will permit myself to look at the military budget issue in conjunction with another issue that has been floating for quite a while both in society as a whole and in the legislative body—the issue of civilian control over the Ministry of Defense. And not only look at it but also project possible relationships. First a little theory. In my opinion, bringing up the issue of civilian control over the Ministry of Defense is quite fair since we have now undertaken the building of a democratic state. In the minds of many, the idea of civilian control is necessarily associated with the existence of a civilian minister of defense. Remember how readily the former minister of defense of Ukraine, General Konstantin Morozov, traded his uniform for a suit; how Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov demonstratively showed up in public in "civvies." Funny. What is happening, in my opinion, is substitution of notions. As if something will change if I sit at the command post, for instance, wearing blue jeans. A civilian minister of defense is a costly item. It is a good, sometimes excellent, experience, but someone else's. We have to be exceedingly careful transplanting somebody else's experience to our native soil. Cacti, for instance, did not take root in Foros; everything seemingly was right, the dry and hot climate—but they did not take root, something was missing. Although quite possibly, given more time and effort, applying more brainpower, maybe we could in fact grow a Crimean cactus. After all, Empress Catherine the Great by her royal will did grow pineapples in St. Petersburg in the middle of winter. *Man can do anything.* So it is not a civilian minister that is the problem, or rather, not only a civilian minister. Let us go back to the potential model, however.

One potential area of civilian control is the problem of financing the armed forces. What are the real needs; how to supervise them; who to listen to? After all, this includes military organizational development, cash pay, accommodation of troops withdrawn from other countries, R&D, weapons and military equipment procurement, and many other things.

The following could become the determinant directions in resolving the question of optimum financing for the Ministry of Defense needs for the next fiscal year:

1. It should be thoroughly thought-through and clearly substantiated what kind of armed forces Russia should have in the end (by the middle or end of the 1990's) that would reliably ensure national defense

and protection of national interests based on evaluation and forecast of potential development of the situation in the world (regions), as well as organizational development of the armed forces of foreign states and improvement of their armaments.

2. It is necessary to outline in concrete detail for the next fiscal year the utmost priorities in military organizational development and the optimum of material means needed for it.
3. Now we have approached directly the question of civilian control. Substantiation for the money requested should be presented to the legislative organs by the minister of defense, the chief of the General Staff, and commanders in chief of armed services. In the course of the deliberations of the Duma and Federation Council Committees on Defense, other representatives (specialists) from the Ministry of Defense, as well as design bureaus and defense industry, may present testimony at the hearings. These are, if you wish, chief lobbyists of the Ministry of Defense's interests. The share of today's armed forces depends to a large extent on the quality of their work.
4. Inside the Ministry of Defense it is necessary to organize continuous control over the expenditure of appropriations on specific line items. Which will permit not only to control but also promptly react to the progress of military organizational development as a whole.

Of course, there must be both open and closed hearings on the budget and its line items in the Federal Assembly, which should be stipulated by the corresponding decrees and laws. And this also will help to a certain extent to raise the level of deputies' knowledge. Protection and safekeeping of state secrets is a task not only for the military but also for lawmakers.

What benefit will this approach to the questions of civilian control over financing of armed forces produce for the Ministry of Defense? In my opinion, this will allow it to: In a concrete and substantiated way, first-hand, make lawmakers aware of the Ministry of Defense's real problems and needs for the upcoming fiscal year;

establish personal contact between the Ministry of Defense leadership and lawmakers, which will allow the latter to study in more detail the situation in the armed forces, see their leadership, conclude "who is who," and to a certain extent supervise their work;

facilitate mutual understanding and professional growth on both sides. Because in order to present a report on a problem and answer the questions, each presenter will need to have an in-depth knowledge on the subject of the report.

What will deputies gain from this work? Only one, but most important, thing—in-depth knowledge of the

armed forces' problems, and participation in their successful resolution, and through that—increased authority in the armed forces, which in the end will allow, in two or three years, a population of politicians capable in their level of preparation to claim the post of minister of defense to be raised. And then this process will proceed naturally and painlessly.

Generally, I have to say that we, the military, need to learn the art of lobbying. There is nothing derogatory in this notion if the correct meaning is put into it: explaining to deputies in depth and in detail the essence of the problem, which pursues the final goal of making an educated decision. Unfortunately, not all have the ability to rise to the level of statesmanlike thinking, and the adoption of many decisions is strongly influenced by personal relations. This coating may be removed through purposeful work in committees, commissions, the back rooms after all. Sitting in one's office, staying cosy and warm, not showing up in the organs of representative power, and thinking that all the armed forces' problems can be resolved only by the president (in the pattern of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee) is a serious delusion and belongs to yesterday.

This is the way I see civilian control in a particular issue, which financing is. The problem, of course, is much deeper and broader, but its resolution will be in the interests of all, including the military. Not to understand it is to fail to see things in perspective.

In conclusion I want to say that the time of destroyers is over—the era of builders is coming. All of us are citizens of one country—Russia. All of us wish it wealth and prosperity. But wishes alone are not enough—we have to think, we have to work. Down with ambitions! It is time to give up on principles in favor of common sense. Let logic, evidence, and expediency become the foundation of the decisions adopted by the state, rather than someone's sympathies or antipathies. Then there will be Russia!

Western Naval Applications of Stealth Technology

95UM0067A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 4-6 Nov 94 p 6

[Article by Fyodor Mozgovoy: "Went Out on the Deck, but There Was No Deck"; "'Invisible' Ships That Captain Nemo Never Dreamed Of"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Shadows Over the Waves

People began long ago, some twenty years back, to talk about the "Stealth" program which could make planes invisible to radar using radio-absorbing materials, special technologies, and unusual fuselage lines. Since the mid-80s, when tests were concluded on the Lockheed F-117A and the Northrop B-2 "flying ghosts," the Pentagon's technical specifications have included, as a mandatory feature of new-generation fighters, the capability of "deceiving" radars.

While the money and the contractors were quickly found to implement the program of stealth aircraft, the idea of using stealth technology for camouflage and concealment of ships was not taken seriously for a long time. It was thought that ships were too large and conspicuous targets. A mast would only have to poke over the horizon, and a missile would be on its way. But there was no harm in trying.

The American stealth ship project was kept in strict secrecy for around 8 years. A model of the "Sea Shadow" developed in the early 80s put out to sea from its floating dock in San Francisco Bay only at night. Not very elegant in appearance, the "stealth" cannot boast of excellent sea-going qualities. Its speed is just 13 knots. But then, its developers were not going for speed. The Sea Shadow was not a prototype of the missile platform of the future in the full sense of the word. It was only used to break in variant uses of stealth technologies in ship building.

Already by the end of the last decade, the results of tests of the "Shadow" began to be incorporated in practice. During the naval blockade of Iraq, the antennas, launchers, and other parts of the ships of the allied forces that "light up" in radars were wrapped in radar-absorbing covers. And in the United States, three "ghost" destroyers of the Arleigh Burke class had already entered service. A total of 26 ships of this class are planned for construction.

Outwardly the new destroyer is nothing like the Sea Shadow, with its "outer-space" silhouette; it is a normal combat ship. Of course, with smoother hull lines, rather than a hull bristling with antennas, radar dishes, guns and superstructures, like its "standard" predecessors. On the Arleigh Burke practically all the missile launchers are arranged on the deck and are intended for vertical launch, as on submarines. The bow turret of the artillery mount appears to be "sleeked down" on all sides to reduce the reflected signal. And there are no antenna radars at all. Or rather, they are complete "submerged" in the superstructure. In addition, the Arleigh Burke has incorporated the idea of so-called "smart skin" developed on the Sea Shadow—21st century technology.

Skin That Thinks!

In the opinion of scientists, besides the means of combatting enemy radar signals, the skin surface of a plane or ship can also carry devices for receipt and processing of information. "Smart skin" will work in the same way as the neural receptors on human skin: signals from them will be processed by a computer and sent to the pilot/captain in the form of a graphic image. In the hull and the skin itself, it is also possible to "hide" a large part of the armament. In a hypothetical design of a missile platform of the future, the antennas will be generally "smeared" over the hull. There will be nothing left on the deck except for the deckhouse and the launch tubes of the missiles. For now that is just on drawings. Not only scientific-technical and financial problems hinder

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their implementation, but also naval traditions. For example, scientists propose getting rid of superstructures (on the Sea Shadow, crammed with electronics and with a crew of just four, the deckhouse looks more like an aircraft cockpit). For any captain, a ship without a deckhouse is like a cart without wheels. The sailors did not like the Arleigh Burke's architecture—the superstructures are canted, and the heavy armored doors as well. Camouflage is all well and good, but it is not worth crushing a hand when you aren't used to it.

No Prophets?

Today elements of stealth technology are being used to develop promising ships in practically all countries: the Israel destroyer Saar-5* and the Japanese "Yokosuka," the British frigate Norfolk, and the Swedish Smjuge surface-effect craft. It would be silly to think that our defense people have simply stood by and watched. What is more, the USSR was the first country to develop a ship using stealth technology.

The appearance of the Kirov cruiser was a shock to foreign military people. It was clear even to the layman that specialists in radar protection had worked on its hull line. Designs that later appeared on the Arleigh Burke class destroyers were incorporated in the Kirov—the same canted superstructures, the vertical launch tubes, composite materials, and the "sleeked down" artillery mounts. Our scientists had been at least a few years ahead of the Americans. And there they stayed. Literally not a single one of our new projects using stealth was launched. The ill-fated cruiser Pyotr Velikiy (the same class as the Kirov) which was already nearly 90 percent ready is still in dock to this day and most likely will never be finished. The other Russian developments in "invisible" ships remained only on paper, and they are locked up tight as state secrets.

The author expresses his gratitude to the associates of the A.N. Krylov Central Scientific Research Institute for their assistance in preparing materials.

AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Into the Stratosphere, but Without Pants

95UM0068A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Nov 94 p 2

[Article by Lt-Col Yuriy Gavrilov: "Into the Stratosphere, but Without Pants"; "A Topical Subject"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Imagine a diver descending to the dark depths without special gear. Or a fireman sent to fight the fiery elements in sports clothes. You can't? Me neither. But a pilot taking off into the stratosphere in his birthday suit, if you'll pardon the expression, is no longer hard for me to imagine. Especially after my recent trips to aviation units. In the military transport aviation regiment where the deputy commander is Yuriy Shuvayev, I observed a familiar picture.

Upon learning of my arrival, Yuriy Vasilyevich did not try to conceal anything:

"Flight gear? Yes, that's a painful question for us. The personnel have not received what is required for some time."

Lt-Col Shuvayev went on to stress that some of the personnel had not been supplied with flight gear (LTO), even a single element of it. Things had reached the point where last spring the regiment commander was forced to draw up a list of those especially in need, and there were quite a few.

"You see, we get young men from the schools." The Chief of Staff of the Regiment, Lt-Col Sergey Burmistrov joined the conversation. "We are supposed to supply the lieutenants with flight gear in the unit. But how can we, when we don't have anything?"

They had plenty of problems with the newcomers even before. But in the old days the main question was the lack of housing. It used to be, the squadron commander would call in the wing commanders and give them the mission of hunting up private quarters for the lieutenants. But now he must add, give some thought to his flight gear too.

Cadets on tours of duty from the Perm Military Air-Technical School find themselves in a difficult position. In order to at least somehow support their capability of working in the aviation equipment, the warehouse issued the officers flight gear that had been in service for years.

After returning from my trip, I described everything I had seen and heard to a deputy department chief of the administration of aviation technical support of the Air Forces Rear Services, Col Mikhail Zubchenok.

"Unfortunately, that is now a typical picture for aviation units" Mikhail Mikhaylovich confirmed.

Why? The answer is simple—there is no money to buy the necessary amount of gear. For example, according to calculations of Air Forces specialists, in 1994 several tens of billions of rubles were needed just to acquire flight gear. After all sorts of squabbling, a much lower sum was approved. But in fact, in nine months less than one fifth of even that meager sum has been received.

The saddest thing is that in contrast to the situation of two or three years ago, now there are enterprises that are prepared to supply the Air Forces with everything they need. The Moscow joint-stock company "Obyedineniye 'Vypel'" (which produces G-suits), the plants "Teploobmennik" (Nizhniy Novgorod) and "Respirator" (Orekhovo-Zuyevo), which specialize in protective helmets and oxygen masks, the Yaroslavl sheepskin and fur factory, and an enterprise in Kazan etc. are offering their wares. What is more, it is not hard to reestablish old ties with producers in Belarus and Ukraine. In short, there is a producer, and there is a client. But there is no money. The enterprises simply refuse to sign contracts without prepayment.

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And the prices! I will give just a few items. In 1989, a sheepskin jacket cost 193 rubles. Now it is 250 thousand. A fur-lined cotton jacket was 100 rubles and is now 209 thousand. A cotton flight suit was 22 rubles, and is now 36 thousand.

The need for the above gear is very great. Especially since the Rear Services of the Air Forces are the only customer for flight gear for all the air components of the Armed Forces. I gave the prices for the items. But now mentally estimate what the required prepayment amounts to. Briefly, this year Col Zubchenok managed to "squeeze out" only a small part of the required sum for acquisition of sheepskin jackets and headsets. But to this point he has not been able to issue advances to 34 enterprises for purchase of fabric, leather and components.

I will allow myself a brief digression here. The uninitiated might think, why squabble about it? So what if the pilot doesn't have his "leathers," he can fly in his light jacket. Of course, in principle he can fly in whatever he pleases. But flight safety requirements were not invented out of thin air; they were dictated by experience. In particular, leather withstands thermal effects tens of degrees higher than other materials. And this means that if there is a fire, a pilot dressed in the sheepskin jacket (which is what they call his "leathers" in the vernacular) has a better chance of not being hurt by the fire.

But to hell with it, the leather. What then if the pilot doesn't have his G-suit (PPK) say, or his oxygen mask (KM)? Then there is an immediate question of his ability to perform his assigned mission. But the warehouses of the Air Forces Rear Services lack both of these in the necessary quantities.

What about the state order, you ask? Can't we order some defense enterprises to produce flight gear? That is the question, why no state order was ever applied to flight gear. In the old days, the Air Forces Rear Services signed contracts with enterprises. Of course there was one nuance in this: at an order "from above," the plant did not have the right to dispose of some percentage of the raw material or the finished goods. They were targeted for the Air Forces Rear Services. Now the picture is different: the "reign of the market" apparently long ago removed the army from the cohort of serious partners. Of course it is convenient for the enterprises to be the free disposers of their own products. Only, won't state interests suffer from this?

The whole rhetorical nature of this question is readily understood by Col Mikhail Zubchenok and his colleagues. They are persistently trying to prove seemingly obvious things: the army requires the financial support of the government. It is not normal when the Armed Forces is maintained by the left-over principle. What authorities has Mikhail Mikhaylovich not appealed to, whom has he not written! But nothing is happening.

From the editors. It would be naive to assume that the problem touched upon in this article is characteristic

only of military aviators. Unfortunately, the Navy, Air Defense Troops, and Ground Forces are all in a similar position. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already written that only after the tragedy of the Komsomolets nuclear submarine did they begin supplying the crews of submarines with rescue wet suits and "Termos" thermal protection equipment. But the Navy does not have enough money to buy enough. For the same reason, the sailors are experiencing a shortage of other emergency rescue equipment.

Take Air Defense aviation. Even in the old days by no means every pilot had a good sea rescue suit. And in the last two years, none at all have gone to the units.

Because of the sharp cut in industrial deliveries of individual NBC protective gear, the combat readiness of the Ground Troops is suffering. For the same reason the civilian population has been left to fend for themselves. In short, we've retreated as far as we can.

Air Army Commander Relieved After AN-12 Crash
95UM0065B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Nov 94 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Nechayev: "Called to Account for Air Crash"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin has decided to relieve two air generals of their duties for the crash of a military transport plane.

On August 5, an An-12 plane crashed in the Transbaykal region. Forty-seven persons died. On the basis of documents from the investigation of this accident, the president of the Russian Federation relieved Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Vasiliyev, air army commander, and the Major-General Vladimir Zagitov, chief of staff of the aviation formation.

NAVAL FORCES

Case Made for Viability of Strategic Nuclear Submarines

95WC0010A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Oct 94 p 5

[Article by Yevgenniy Vladimirovich Myasnikov, candidate of physical and mathematical sciences and staff member at the Center for the Study of Problems of Arms Control, Ecology, and Energetics under the Moscow Physical-Technical Institute, under "Arms" rubric: "Find and Destroy!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One often hears the opinion in the mass media that our strategic submarines are very vulnerable to the enemy, they are constantly being tracked by the antisubmarine defense forces of the

United States, and in critical circumstances they will be destroyed by nuclear weapons before they can perform their combat missions.

Such ideas developed not only in the broad public but also among the scientific colleagues of the central institutes of the Ministry of Defense of Russia and among the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

The question of how undetectable our submarines are is by no means an idle one. There remain few people who can talk seriously about a large-scale nuclear war. Nevertheless the world has not yet renounced the possession of nuclear weapons. They will continue to perform the role of a deterrent factor in the near future. But one must note that the demands on the strategic nuclear forces are changing qualitatively.

The number of warheads, their power, and their accuracy are no longer as important as they were at the time of the "cold war." Even one warhead falling on the territory of a country represents an unacceptable loss. Significantly more importance is being attached to such factors as safety in the servicing of nuclear weapons, the preservation of the environment, and, of course, the cost of maintaining the nuclear shield. But perhaps the most important criterion in the assessment of strategic nuclear forces may be their invulnerability, that is, their reliable protection against a possible preemptive action by a

potential enemy and the capability to inflict a nuclear retaliatory strike against his territory in any conceivable situation. And the farther the process of reducing nuclear arms goes, the more acute this question will be.

The widespread and greatly propagandized opinion about the vulnerability of our missile-armed submarines has deep historical roots. Sea-based ballistic missiles of the first generation had a quite limited range (see Table 1). Soviet submarines with these missiles had to go on combat patrol along the shores of the United States and in the open sea, where the infrastructure of the antisubmarine defense of the United States was well developed. The more favorable geographical position of the United States made it possible for them to deploy a system of means for the detection and tracking of Soviet submarines of the first generation. Moreover the latter were very noisy and hence easily detected. In particular, the American system SOSUS intended for the acoustical detection of submarines was quite effective. The antennas of the SOSUS were extended along the west and east coasts of the United States, along the antisubmarine boundaries between North Cape and Bear Island, between Greenland and Iceland, between the Faeroe Islands and Great Britain, and also in the Pacific Ocean. It is probable that during those years it was relatively easy not only to detect and secretly track our submarines over long periods of time but also even to identify each specific ship.

Table 1. Armament of Russian Strategic Submarines (table compiled using data from "Ballisticheskiye rakety podvodnykh lodok BMF Rossii (USSR)" [Ballistic Missiles of Submarines of the Navy of Russia (USSR)], PIKA Ltd., 1993.)

| Generation | Class of Submarine | Type of Missile | Range (km) (in parentheses range of missile modification) | Year Introduced |
|------------|--------------------|-----------------|---|-----------------|
| First | pr. 611 AB | R-11FM | 150 | 1956 |
| | pr. 629 | R-13 | 650 | |
| | pr. 658 | R-13 | 650 | 1960 |
| | pr. 629 A | R-21 | 1,400 | 1963 |
| | pr. 658 M | R-21 | 1,400 | 1963 |
| Second | pr. 667 A | RSM-25 | 2,400 (3,000) | 1968 |
| | pr. 667 B | RSM-40 | 7,800 (9,100) | 1973 |
| | pr. 667 BD | RSM-40 | 7,800 (9,100) | 1973 |
| | pr. 667 AM | RSM-45 | 3,900 | 1980 |
| Third | pr. 667 BDR | RSM-50 | 6,500 (8,000) | 1983 |
| | pr. 941 | RSM-52 | 8,300 | 1983 |
| | pr. 667 BDRM | RSM-54 | 8,300 | 1986 |

The situation changed by the end of the 1970's and beginning of the 1980's with the introduction of the up-to-date strategic nuclear missile submarine cruisers (RPKSN) of projects 667 B and 667 BDR and subsequently projects 941 and 667 BDRM (in the West, these submarines are known as Delta I, Delta III, Typhoon, and Delta IV, respectively). These missile-armed submarines carry missiles capable of

hitting targets practically anywhere in the territory of the United States after launch from bases on Kola Peninsula or Kamchatka. It was no longer necessary for the Soviet RPKSN to cross antisubmarine boundaries and enter the ocean. It is significant that the submarines of the new generations became less noisy and this diminished the possibility of their detection by American antisubmarine forces.

What can threaten a Russian missile submarine patrolling in the seas adjacent to the territory of Russia (in the Barents Sea or Sea of Okhotsk, for example)? If an armed conflict arises, the adversary will not be able to make effective use of his surface fleet and aircraft there, because he will encounter the still-powerful defensive forces of the Russian Navy. This is all the more impossible in the ice-covered waters of the Arctic. The effectiveness of long-range weapons is also doubtful, because the position of the target is unknown. At first glance, therefore, a threat can come only from the torpedo submarines of the adversary. In a crisis situation, theoretically only they can suddenly and certainly neutralize Russian strategic submarines (before they are able to launch their missiles). To do this, the submarines of the enemy will have to secretly and continually track Russian RPKSN over a long time in the expectation of the corresponding order for the use of their weapons.

How realistic is such a threat? To understand this, let us attempt to answer a simpler question. At what range do the technical means of the most up-to-date American nuclear-powered submarines of the Los Angeles Class make it possible in principle to detect our strategic submarines?

Table 2 presents estimates of the maximum range at which a nuclear-powered submarine of the Los Angeles Class can detect a Russian RPKSN under the most favorable weather conditions. These results were obtained on the basis of materials published in open technical literature and estimates from specialists. Even on the basis of such approximate estimates, it is possible to draw some very interesting conclusions that could have important practical applications for the deployment of Russian strategic forces in the future.

Table 2. Estimates of the Maximum Range of Detection of Russian RPKSN Under the Most Favorable Weather Conditions

| Project Number | Ocean (km) | Arctic (km) | Shallow Water (km) |
|--------------------|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| pr. 611AB | more than 1,000 | 200 | 100 |
| pr. 629 | 1,000 | 100 | 50 |
| pr. 658 | more than 1,000 | 200 | 100 |
| pr. 667A | more than 1,000 | 200 | 100 |
| pr. 667B | less than 260-320 | 80 | 60 |
| pr. 667BD | less than 260-320 | 80 | 60 |
| pr. 667 BDR | less than 130-200 | 50 | 30 |
| pr. 941 | less than 120-300 | 40 | 20 |
| pr. 667 BDRM | less than 65 | 5-40less than 15 | |
| RPKSN of year 2000 | less than 5 | less than 5 | less than 5 |

At a given noise level of a submarine, for example, the range at which it can be detected in a shallow sea is significantly less than in the ocean. This conclusion is further evidence that the introduction of up-to-date Russian RPKSN significantly improved the stability of Russian naval strategic forces with respect to possible preemptive measures of the enemy.

Still another interesting conclusion that can be drawn on the basis of the table is that these estimates put in doubt the very capability of the submarines of a potential enemy to track Russian RPKSN continuously in a shallow sea over such long periods of time as weeks or months. The range of detection of a submarine is a very changeable quantity, for there is a large range in which natural factors change. There are periods when natural conditions are favorable and the range of detection may reach 20-30 km, as follows from the table. But these periods are replaced by unfavorable weather and the detection range falls disastrously. At a wind speed of more than 10 meters/second (and the probability of this in the Barents Sea, according to long-term observations, ranges from 12 to 48 percent depending on the season),

the maximum range at which it is possible to detect a RPKSN of Project 667 BDRM in shallow water does not exceed 3-5 km. It is hardly likely that a submarine commander will decide to track a Russian submarine continuously under such conditions. It therefore appears unrealistic that as a result of the rise of a crisis situation all Russian missile-armed submarines can be destroyed within 15-30 minutes. For if the enemy tries to do this but is unsuccessful, retaliation may be inevitable. Just one submarine missile cruiser of Project 941 can send 200 warheads to targets in a single volley—more than enough to turn the territory of any potential adversary into ruins. The strategic naval forces of Russia now include 30 RPKSN and a large share of them will be deployed at sea in the event of an escalation of tension.

The estimates presented for the range of detection also graphically show the importance of noise suppression. It is important in this connection to stress the necessity of supporting a low noise level as the RPKSN "ages" and of replacing obsolete missile-armed submarines with new ones with better noise characteristics if Russia makes a choice in favor of sea-based strategic forces. There is

evidence that the most up-to-date Russian multipurpose submarines of the fourth generation have already achieved a noise level that corresponds to a maximum detection range of no more than 5 km in shallow water under the very best weather conditions. If this is so, then it would be a strong argument in favor of the deployment of the future nuclear arsenal of Russia primarily on a small number of low-noise submarines.

Cases of collisions of submarines are clear illustrations of the fact that the detection range of submarines in shallow water is quite small. There has been a great deal of discussion in the press of the incidents with nuclear-powered submarines that took place in the Barents Sea in February 1992 and March 1993. Did the Americans have an interest in these collisions with Russian submarines near the shores of Russia? Obviously not. Then why did they allow them to happen, if they can track Russian submarines for a long time under any weather conditions?

Competent sources confirm that in both cases none of the submarines "heard" the other prior to these collisions and none could take measures to avoid it. Fortunately, both incidents occurred without loss of human life and the damage is assessed at "only" the fact that both American submarines involved were removed from the effective combat strength and are subject to salvaging, whereas at least hundreds of millions of rubles have been spent on the repair of the Russian submarines.

Thus, the conclusion suggests itself that submarines operating in shallow water do not have the technical means to detect another secretly operating submarine and to prevent a possible collision. It is therefore difficult to agree with the widespread opinion to the effect that the submarines of the United States are constantly tracking Russian RPKSN. The logic of the facts indicates otherwise.

Medical Radiation Treatment Facility in Obninsk

95UM0065A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Nov 94 p 3

[Article by Vasilii Fatigarov: "Health of the Sailors in the Safes of Military Laboratory"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The laboratory, created thirty-five years ago in Obninsk, has demonstrated in practice the need for its existence. It is obvious, after all, that the physical condition and morale of a crew is one of the main components of combat readiness.

Initially the laboratory, organized at the initiative of Major-General of Navy Medical Service Yevgeniy Ivanov, then the chief of Medical Service of the Navy, was intended for monitoring radiation safety in the Navy, but with time its functions were expanded. Added to radiology were toxicology, hygiene, and epidemiology. "Specialists of the corresponding departments of our laboratory regularly work in the fleets," said Major General Georgiy Sharayevskiy, chief of Naval Medical Service. "There is an opportunity to promptly bring pressure to bear on commanders who violate established requirements. To the point of turning over cases to the procuracy."

It is important to note that laboratory physicians have mastered an original method of determining radiation dosage from blood analysis that has often been used in naval accidents when individual dosimeters were useless. For the last five years, the laboratory has also been involved in active scientific work, in addition to its supervisory functions.

Seven individuals are working on their candidates dissertations, including Colonel Gennadiy Amiyev, chief of the Central Medical Laboratory of the Navy. The radiology department under the supervision of Lieutenant-Colonel of Medical Service Ignatiy Kondratov has developed a method of gas chromatography, unique in the world, for determining nitrites in all types of products and in the environment.

Colonel Lev Yanytsin, chief hygienist of the Armed Forces, noted the laboratory's great contribution to monitoring the maintenance of normal work and rest conditions of seamen and stressed that the importance of the laboratory today is growing, despite problems with supply of modern office equipment.

UKRAINE

Military Cooperation, 'Partnership for Peace' Participation Explored

NATO-Warsaw Pact 'Bridge of Cooperation-94' Activity

95UM0057A Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian*
5 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by Major Dmytro Shurko: "The 'Partnership' Is
Launched on the 'Bridge of Cooperation'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An event that could, without exaggeration, be a defining one for the future of all of Europe took place recently on a training ground close to the quiet Polish town of Bedrusko, not far from ancient Poznan. The Bridge of Cooperation-94 military exercises were conducted there over the course of a week. They were the first field exercises within the context of the Partnership for Peace program. They were also the first event since the time of the Cold War where military subunits of the NATO countries and the former Warsaw Pact, who only a few years ago considered each other to be potential adversaries, operated jointly and under a unified command while performing a unified mission. It was symbolic that those tasks pertained purely to UN peacekeeping functions. The countries sending troops to Bedrusko were, naturally, Poland, as well as Italy, Great Britain, Germany, the United States, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Netherlands, Slovakia, Latvia, Romania and Ukraine.

The list of dignitaries, "very important people" in UN terminology, who were at the opening ceremony itself testifies to the great significance assigned to this exercise by the world community. NATO was represented by senior officers, among whom were the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of NATO in Europe, the American General Joulwan, along with generals Nansen, Maddox, Jamerson and others. The exercise was visited by the president of the Republic of Poland, Lech Walesa. Among the prestigious individuals representing Ukraine were Deputy Minister of Defense and Ground Forces Commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Colonel-General Vasyl Sobkov.

The exercise, considering these circumstances, had great political significance. If we take into account the priceless experience of the direct association of servicemen from thirteen countries, then it becomes obvious that the exercise was a palpable blow both against the "face of the enemy" and the psychology of the Cold War years itself.

There were, true, some echoes of that psychology. There was naturally some uneasiness among the journalists and public figures over the question of why Russia did not take part in the exercise. There were several versions of explanations of that fact.

The Minister of Defense of the Republic of Poland, Petro Kolodzeychuk, expressed himself quite candidly

on this score. Russia, in his opinion, is too sensitive to the prospects for the expansion of NATO. The North Atlantic Alliance itself is gradually developing from a purely defensive organization into a new structure, which will have the opportunity to guarantee peace and tranquillity on the European continent and which no country will be prohibited from joining.

There was a clearly political accent to these exercises. One of the main themes in all of the speeches by Polish officials was the readiness of Poland to join NATO. The exemplary organization of the exercises convinced each of the participants, and certainly their Western counterparts, that Poland, and its armed forces in particular, is ready to perform any task at the Western European level.

Poland thus gave us to understand that it is ready even now for the closer cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance that is envisaged by the Partnership for Peace program. The impression was formed that the other Eastern European countries had a more cautious attitude toward this fledgling initiative, so as not to accidentally smother the newborn in loving embraces. Their leaders made no loud declarations. It is obvious, however, that an aspiration for the development of closer interaction, in the military sphere among other things, is present both on the part of NATO and on the part of the national governments of the so-called Vyshehrad group.

This is entirely natural against the background of the strengthening of general European integration processes. It is also natural that the NATO countries are concerned, no less than with the pace of that convergence, that no country drop out of the general order either accidentally or, worse, intentionally. It is clearly vitally important today to preserve the prospects for the further movement of East and West toward each other, and to provide for the peaceful evolution of the former irreconcilable military and political blocs into a unified system of European security.

That is why the presence of a Russian subunit at the Bedrusko proving ground would have been not only possible, but even desirable on the part of the organizers. They are expecting Russia at similar upcoming exercises that will take place in Holland in October of this year. The presence of a Russian subunit would be confirmation of the fact that that great country, our closest neighbor, is not standing apart from the general European processes, and is an active participant in them. On the contrary, the absence of such an initiative of the part of Russia, as can be very easily predicted, would be perceived with uneasiness, as unfavorable evidence that this giant is refusing to enter the open door of the European home.

The organizers of the Bridge of Cooperation-94 emphasized continually that these exercises are being conducted under far from a "NATO" scenario, and are the first experience in interaction of the subunits from the armed forces of these countries, each of which is acting under its own, national rules and statutes.

Five multinational companies were formed from the subunits of the participating countries. The Ukrainian platoon was organizationally part of Delta Company, and operated together with British, Rumanian and Dutch platoons.

These five companies successively ran through practical exercises in surveillance, patrolling, the performance of monitoring functions at checkpoints, and the escorting of humanitarian convoys and refugees.

The commander of Delta Company, British Major Bens Trouver, had a high regard for the actions of our subunit and, in particular, platoon commander Senior Lieutenant Andriy Fedorov. The best among the soldiers in the exercise operations was Junior Sergeant Kostyantyn Adam. Private Mykola Chernopilsky fired more accurately than the rest. These soldiers were given awards directly by the leaders of the exercise, Polish Brigadier General Zihmund Sadovskyy and American General William Carter.

It may be stated with certainty today that our motorized-rifle platoon from the honored Zalizna Division defended the honor of the Ukrainian banner in worthy fashion. Our soldiers acted skillfully and quickly, like true professionals. That is even though our subunit, one of the smallest that took part in the exercise, was composed exclusively of conscript servicemen. They were thus forced to compete not only with professionals, but also with the "special forces" of the participating countries, who have undergone special schooling and training to participate in UN peacekeeping operations.

The efforts of the Poles in organizing the training elicited great respect. Our Polish counterparts created ideal conditions for the participants. The system of transport support was marvelously set up. The enormous "machinery" of the exercises operated precisely and irreproachably. This testified convincingly to the high organizational ability of the Polish troops and the professionalism of their officers.

The first joint field exercises in history, Bridge of Cooperation-94, conducted within the context of the Partnership for Peace program, made a profound and agreeable impression on each of the participants. It may be stated with certainty that this is just the beginning of practical actions in the direction of strengthening trust and understanding in Europe. But a very promising beginning. Recall that upcoming similar exercises will be taking place in October of this year in Holland.

Ministry of Defense Briefing on 'Bridge of Cooperation-94'

95UM0057B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
19 Oct 94 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Major Volodymyr Knysh under the rubric "Our Place in the World": "Security Is Created in Partnership"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Partnership for Peace was the*

topic of a briefing organized by the press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

The Assistant Minister of Defense for Military-Political Issues, Major-General Vadym Hrechanyinov, related how the idea of the Partnership, which has been transformed into a concrete program, came about. Recall that first came the initiative of Polish President Lech Walesa in the creation of a NATO adjunct, and the proposal by ex-President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk on the creation of a security zone from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the Baladyur plan and others.

But the United States and NATO successfully and, most importantly, promptly made use of the "security vacuum" that existed in Central and Eastern Europe. This vacuum was to have been filled by the Partnership for Peace. Ukraine joined it (among the first ten) on February 8 of this year.

The Partnership program is more political than military today, because it gives the post-socialist countries the chance to move in the future toward the resolution of the issue of access to NATO.

The program unites 38 participating countries, with 16 of them from NATO and 22 from the CIS (aside from Belarus and Kyrgyzstan) or others.

Is there not a contradiction between the participation of Ukraine in the Partnership programs and the non-allied status that has been adopted by our state? There is no such contradiction, in the opinion of Major-General V. Hrechanyinov, since this program is considered to be an instrument of security in the region. One must recall the fact, however, that the Partnership does not provide any guarantees on the part of NATO for the participating countries.

Our state is taking an active part in the practical programs of the Partnership, which are, incidentally, financed directly by the participating countries. The Bridge of Cooperation-94 military exercises that were described in the briefing by MO [Ministry of Defense] press officer Major Dmytro Shkurko testifies to this.

The Bridge of Cooperation-94 military exercises took place in Poland, at the Bedrusko military proving ground, which is fifteen kilometers from the city of Poznan. They were the first field exercises within the context of the NATO Partnership for Peace program. They were conducted from 9 through 17 September 1994.

Thirteen countries took part in the exercises, each of which was represented by subunits. Five multinational companies were formed from those subunits. Ukraine was represented by a motorized-rifle platoon from the Zalizna Division from the Carpathian Military District. The platoon commander is Senior Lieutenant Andriy Fedorov.

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The total number of participants was 650 servicemen. About another 250 servicemen were active at the operational staff and the exercise support staff.

Most of the countries participating in the Partnership for Peace program that did not take part in the exercises sent their own observers.

Field tasks in peacekeeping were run through at the exercises, namely the establishment of surveillance posts and operations under conditions of a peacekeeping mission, the establishment of checkpoints and operations at those points, the protection of the stationing area and the command post under conditions of a peacekeeping mission, patrolling in the zone of responsibility, the neutralization of mines and airborne medical evacuation, and the escorting of convoys with humanitarian aid, among others.

The principal aim of the exercises was to reach a uniform understanding of the essence of peacekeeping operations, and to practice interaction as part of multinational subunits. The exercises, that is, did not have as their aim revealing the capabilities or weaknesses in the training of the subunits from the participating countries. The skills and behavior of peacekeeping forces were practiced according to the national statutes of the participating countries.

The tactical exercises under which each subunit acted were explicitly devoid of any political analogies whatsoever, and did not pertain to any conflict situation in the world.

The expenditures connected with participation in the exercises were made at the expense of the participating countries. Poland provided means of communication, transport within the bounds of the training area, medical support and the opportunity to make use of the training ground free of charge.

A second set of field exercises, Spirit of Cooperation-94, will take place in Holland from 21 through 28 October 1994 at the training ground of the armed forces of the Netherlands at Veluwe de Harskamp near the city of Strum. The staff of the 4th Division of the Armed Forces of the Netherlands stationed in the city of Ermelo is engaged in organizing them. The exercises are a measure being carried out purely along NATO lines, within the context of the realization of the Partnership for Peace program. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of NATO in Europe is responsible for the conduct of the exercises.

Eleven countries will be taking part in the exercises. Ukraine will be represented by a platoon of air-mobile troop under the command of Senior Lieutenant Ivan Kosynskyy. This subunit was trained at the Zhytomyr Training Center for Air-Mobile Troops.

The multinational company, aside from Ukrainian platoons, will also have platoons from Canada, Netherlands and Sweden.

The participants in the exercises will perform tasks analogous to those that were practiced at the Bridge of Cooperation-94 exercises.

Ukrainian Unit in the Netherlands

95UM0057C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
27 Oct 94 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Valeriy Korol and Major Dmytro Shkurko, officers of the press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, in the Netherlands: "The Conditions Are as Close to Real as Possible"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The multinational exercises within the context of the Partnership for Peace program, under the name Spirit of Cooperation-94, are continuing at the Harskamp training ground in the Netherlands. The military units of the countries of the former socialist camp are taking part in military exercises on the territory of NATO countries for the first time.

As opposed to the prior similar exercises that took place in September of this year at the Polish training ground at Bedrusko, these are going on continuously, 24 hours a day. The subunits replace each other every day at the training sites. This system, in the opinion of the leader of the exercises, Dutch General Kusters, makes it possible to achieve the optimal results in training the exercise participants to take part in peacekeeping operations.

The tasks that the subunits are performing include convoy duty for humanitarian assistance, patrolling of free zones, protection of facilities etc. They all have a real foundation, taken from the experience of troop peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Cambodia and other "hot spots." The tasks that the subunits are receiving—attack on a convoy, an incident at checkpoints, a hostile attitude toward the multinational forces on the part of the warring parties etc.—are as close as possible to reality.

More than 50 military observers from 24 countries are present at the exercises. They have an opportunity to become familiarized with the actions of all of the subunits and the system for organizing military training at all training sites. Only Russia among the CIS countries has sent its own observers to Holland. One of them, General Staff of Russia Operational Training Directorate Deputy Chief Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Kirilov, expressed satisfaction at the sure actions of the Ukrainian subunit.

The Ukrainian air-mobile platoon under the command of Senior Lieutenant Ivan Kosynskyy ran through tasks connected with the escorting of humanitarian aid convoys on October 25. The assault troops were able to overcome illegally placed checkpoints, "repel" an armed attack on the column, provide first aid and perform measures related to the evacuation of the wounded.

The Spirit of Cooperation-94 exercises continue.

Exercise Participation in the Netherlands

95UM0057D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
28 Oct 94 p 1

[News item from the press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine: "The Ukrainian Checkpoints Hold Up in Worthy Fashion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The multinational military exercises within the context of the Partnership for Peace continue in Holland. The Ukrainian platoon, which together with platoons from Poland, Germany and Great Britain is organizationally part of company F (Foxtrot), yesterday practiced tasks that are typical of peacekeeping forces. They included the monitoring and protection of the so-called "free zone." The Ukrainian servicemen let convoys with humanitarian aid, means of transport, "local inhabitants" and refugees pass through their zone of responsibility.

The air-mobile platoon, during its service at the checkpoints, had to operate under varying scenarios. The assault troops reacted to attempts to mine the road, provided first aid to those stricken, and turned aside the provocations of hostilely inclined groups of the opposing sides.

Regional Sponsorship, Support for Ukraine's Navy Detailed

Military Council Appeal on Sponsorship

95UM0061A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
27 Oct 94 p 1

[Unattributed news item: "Support Is a Great Cause"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Military Council of the Ukrainian Navy has promulgated an appeal to President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma. It expressed the support of the personnel of the Ukrainian Navy for the Edict of the President on the organization of sponsorship for naval vessels.

We hope, the appeal states, that this patriotic endeavor will be adopted and taken up by all oblasts, labor collectives, youth organizations and public associations. The understanding and real concern of the people of Ukraine are becoming a mighty force and moral support for us, which will help us to overcome all difficulties, proclaims the appeal by the Military Council of the Navy.

Western Oblasts Sponsor Warships, Ryzenko Heads Commission

95UM0061B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
28 Oct 94 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA special correspondent Captain 2nd Rank Oleksandr Shcherbakov: "Ukraine Needs a Strong Fleet—And They Seem To Understand That in the Oblasts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Naval Forces of Western Ukraine." This phrase was used in the Crimea and

Sevastopol last year by those ill-disposed toward the young fleet of our nation, which was being built. And there was a grain, albeit a very small one, of truth in it. The sailors obtained moral and material support primarily from Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts. The opponents of the navy drew the conclusion, on that basis, that Ukraine has no need of its own fleet and all the rest.

Time has passed, however. The naval forces have been developed, and the ships have gone out to sea and taken part in joint exercises with foreign ships.

The city and rayon soviets of the Dnipropetrovsk and Kirovohrad oblasts have now appealed, on their own initiative, to the commander of the Ukrainian navy, Vice-Admiral Volodymyr Bezkorovaynyy, with the intention of sponsoring the Slavutych special-purpose ship and the Ukrayina missile cruiser.

The Committee on Issues of Social Protection for Servicemen of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, headed by Major-General Vilen Martyrosyan, has performed energetic work in this area. They obviously realize in that committee that our nation is building a modern fleet virtually from zero today, even though it should be done on the basis of the shared Black Sea Fleet. That is why it is worse, as they say a hundred times worse, for the Ukrainian sailors and their families than, say, their colleagues in military service in Odessa or in Lviv. They need not so much material as moral support now.

They received it, and immediately, from President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma, who issued the Edict "The Organization of Sponsorship of Ships of the Ukrainian Navy." This elicited support among the servicemen of the fleet. An expanded session of the Military Council of the Ukrainian Navy was held at which the list of ships, military units and fleet institutions with which sponsorship ties may be established was approved. The Military Council of the Navy adopted an appeal to the heads of the oblast soviets, to support the initiative of Dnipropetrovsk and Kirovohrad oblasts and offer strong assistance to the growing fleet, which is the guarantee of the protection of the southern boundaries of Ukraine. The leadership of the fleet, fulfilling the request of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, prepared a list of the priority problems of the Navy that will be studied by the government, and for some of which operational resolutions will be adopted. The commander of the Navy issued an order to allocate specific staff, directorate or formation and unit officers to each oblast of Ukraine. A special commission was created that is headed by Navy Chief of Staff Rear-Admiral Oleksiy Ryzenko; it is already occupied with questions of interaction with future sponsors. The commission may be telephoned in Sevastopol at (0690) 44-00-90 or 44-18-39.

The leaders of the Kharkiv oblast soviet and the oblast administration of Kiev, as well as the chairman of the Kolos agricultural firm in Chornobay in Cherkasy

Oblast, Semen Pkhidenko, by the way, have already appealed to the naval command.

All of the necessary samples of the documents that went into force by directive of the naval commander have now been prepared. The necessary legal conditions have thus been provided.

One would very much like to believe that the work to carry out the Edict of the President of Ukraine "The Organization of Sponsorship of Ships of the Ukrainian Navy" will not degenerate into a brief campaign, but will rather become a truly broad movement in our country. All indications for it are favorable, in any case.

Bezkorovaynyy, Martyrosyan Meet on Sponsorship

95UM0061C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
29 Oct 94 p 2

[News item by Yuriy Povkh and Andriy Lysenko of Ukrinform: "The Ukrainian Navy Is a Joint Cause"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The problems of service and the everyday life of sailors were discussed at a meeting of the commander of the Ukrainian navy, Vice-Admiral Volodymyr Bezkorovaynyy, and the chairman of the Committee on Issues of Social Protection for Servicemen of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Major-General Vilen Martyrosyan.

The commander of the national naval forces visited Kiev in order to coordinate the actions of official and public organizations aimed at the fulfillment of the Edict of the President of Ukraine on the organization of sponsorship of ships of the Ukrainian Navy. Volodymyr Bezkorovaynyy also discussed questions of offering sponsorship assistance to the naval sailors with the leaders of the Kiev oblast and city state administrations. This will also be discussed at the upcoming meeting of the head of the naval department and the Lviv oblast leadership.

Ivano-Frankivsk Role, Bezkorovaynyy Visit

95UM0061D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
2 Nov 94 p 1

[Unattributed news item: "Transcarpathia Will Assist the Ukrainian Fleet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukrainian Navy Commander Vice-Admiral Volodymyr Bezkorovaynyy met with the leadership of Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast.

Questions of the concrete collaboration of the Ivano-Frankivsk area with the Ukrainian Navy in the fulfillment of the Edict of the President of Ukraine on the sponsorship of the Ukrainian fleet were discussed at this meeting.

The business manager of the executive committee of the oblast soviet, Mykola Kravtsiv, expressed concrete proposals pertaining to assistance for Ukrainian sailors.

Khmelnyskyy Oblast Role, Bezkorovaynyy Visit

95UM0061E Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
3 Nov 94 p 1

[Unattributed news item: "Khmelnyskyy Region Takes on Sponsorship of Ships"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukrainian Navy Commander Vice-Admiral Volodymyr Bezkorovaynyy visited the Khmelnyskyy area. He met with the deputy chairmen of the executive committee of the oblast soviet, Viktor Lundyshch and Mykola Darmansky. The discussion centered on the sponsorship of ships and sailors by the oblasts of Ukraine, including Khmelnyskyy. A preliminary agreement was reached. This issue will be worked out in more detail during the visit of a special delegation of representatives of the fleet from Sevastopol.

Security Service Head Discusses SBU Work, Problems

95UM0058A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
27 Oct 94 pp 1-3

[Interview with Security Service of Ukraine Chairman Valeriy Vasylovych Malikov by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Captain Volodymyr Vyrva: "The SBU Is Only Trying To Be Open"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Security Service of Ukraine [SBU] Chairman Valeriy Malikov met recently with journalists from a number of newspapers in the capital and Ukrainian television and radio. The meeting was unique and timely for two reasons. First, that the intelligence service had never before had direct contact with representatives of the mass media, remaining behind their iron fences with many locks. Second, it was interesting to meet with a person who has only recently come to head up the SBU, even though it is not new to him (Valeriy Vasylovych was named to the post of chairman of the SBU only three months ago).

From the press release from the meeting of the SBU chairman and journalists: "The Security Service of Ukraine was created on 20 September 1991 in accordance with the Decree of the Supreme Soviet 'The Creation of the National Security Service.' A fundamental change in the conceptual framework for the activity of the young Ukrainian intelligence service, based on the repudiation of an orientation—traditional for the former state security organs—toward permanent confrontation with the intelligence services of countries with different social orders, of ideological rigidity and a search for enemies on that basis, of the inclination toward methods of force when solving problems, all took place during the ensuing period, simultaneously with radical changes in its personnel.

This meeting was thus no accident either. As Valeriy Malikov emphasized in answering a question from a correspondent of Ukrainian television, in meeting with the journalists he was fulfilling the Law "The Security Service of Ukraine," which states that its leaders shall

report periodically to the people on the activity of the SBU. But the Security Service, in the words of Valeriy Vasylovych, is only trying to be open, since no intelligence agency in the world can be entirely such, given the specific nature of the tasks that it faces.

And yet the journalists received exhaustive answers to almost all of their questions this day, naturally within the allowable limits for them. The chairman of the SBU, in talking about the intelligence work, informed us that the Main Directorate for Intelligence Interaction with Counterintelligence Subdivisions has lately directed its efforts—aside from the performance of exclusively intelligence programs and tasks to ensure the security of the representations of Ukraine abroad—toward solving problems of economic security and the access of the state to international markets with market-competitive products. That is already having definite consequences. The information acquired by the SBU has provided an opportunity to avoid the conclusion of 110 unprofitable contracts with foreign firms, in an amount of more than 900 million dollars. A hundred enterprises have also been assisted in reaching economically advantageous agreements with foreign firms, in an amount of more than 250 million dollars.

Valeriy Malikov dwelled in detail on the work of the Main Directorate for Counterintelligence. The development of its new structure and standard personnel complement was prompted by fundamentally important political, economic and operational considerations connected with the fact that Ukraine has become a party to international law. Counterintelligence protects the interests of the state and citizens against the covert intelligence activity of foreign intelligence services, organizations, groups and certain individuals. A little less than a year ago, for instance, two individuals were convicted of espionage activity, with one of them, incidentally, proving to be a serviceman (Valeriy Vasylovych, true, did not name the country for which the spies were working—V.V.). Sixteen informants, operating on behalf of various countries in both the near and far abroad, were also discovered just this year.

The counterintelligence efforts are also directed toward protecting economic security in the sphere of defense industrial production, science, ecology, the currency and financial system, and international scientific, technical, trade and economic channels. It was thus no coincidence that the chairman of the SBU, answering a question, stressed that "I would not venture to call Ukraine a corrupt state, but crime does exist in the economy." An analysis of the materials from more than 1,300 criminal and 700 operational investigative cases that were or are being brought by the Security Service, testifies that these crimes are concentrated, first and foremost, in the banking, credit and finance systems, which the criminal world is actively using for its own interests. The unlawful activity of 25 organized criminal groups and corrupt officials associated

with them has already been uncovered and curtailed. The investigation of seven officials of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties (for bribery), executives of the Chernivets Machine Building Plant (for theft of state property in particularly large amounts), and some other important criminal cases has been completed.

Both officials and employees of law-enforcement bodies and the procuracy, among others, have been or are under investigation, indicated Valeriy Vasylovych. Three employees of the SBU have even been convicted. One could boldly conclude from this that the offensive against crime and unlawful activity in the economy is being waged more resolutely, without regard for individuals or their positions. The Edict of the President of Ukraine, "Urgent Measures To Strengthen the Fight Against Crime," has imparted a strong impetus of that work. Money, goods and assets worth 14 billion karbovantsi have been confiscated, and 171 billion karbovantsi have been turned into state income in the form of fines, based on operational materials obtained by the subdivisions of the Security Service just during the effective period of this Edict alone. The words of Valeriy Malikov resonated on this score: "Millions and billions individually do not astound anyone anymore, but the budget of our state is comprised of them."

Valeriy Malikov, speaking of other areas of the activity of the Security Service of Ukraine, indicated in particular the good work of his information analysis directorate. All of the events in Ukraine that were predicted by the staffers there (pertaining first and foremost to Crimea and the coal industry), after all, have come to pass. Valeriy Vasylovych emphasized therein that the SBU does not fight such strikes, as some think. The task of the Service is only to anticipate the further development of these or those unfavorable events for the state.

The chairman of the SBU also refuted assertions that the intelligence service is using psychotropic methods to influence individuals that are under investigation. They have, however, had to resort to the services of psychics on some occasions when they were looking for both criminals or people who had disappeared without a trace.

Answering a question pertaining to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valeriy Malikov indicated that the state of the Ukrainian Army is very grave, but not bad enough to say that our Armed Forces do not exist. Touching on the cutbacks and withdrawal from the territory of Ukraine of nuclear missile potential, he pointed out that a number of steps were taken at one time on this issue that were not to the benefit of the state.

The Security Service of Ukraine has arranged close collaboration with foreign intelligence services on questions of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the fight against the drug trade and terrorism. They have found common ground with the CIA, FBI, Federal Counterintelligence Service of Russia and their colleagues from other countries.

Valeriy Malikov also did not leave unmentioned a host of problems that are impeding the final creation of the security bodies of the independent Ukrainian state today. This process, after all, is not yet completed. Personnel problems remain the most acute for the SBU today. The inadequate pay and unsatisfactory housing conditions are leading to a steady outflow of personnel, including skilled and experienced specialists. The dangerous possibility of the loss of intellectual potential of the intelligence service is arising. It is becoming virtually impossible to attract urgently needed experienced specialists, including legal scholars, economists, and specialists in banking affairs, to the Service. There are also quite

a few problems with providing the structural subdivisions of the SBU with automated information systems and specialized and criminological hardware.

The meeting nonetheless concluded on an optimistic note. The journalists, after all, were able to satisfy their professional curiosity, while the chairman of the SBU, so to speak, was able to report on the activity of the agency he heads. This feedback, in my opinion, was beneficial to both parties, since while the Service is only trying to be open, even that openness will help to dispel the various rumors and gossip about its activity that arise among the public from time to time.

ARMS TRADE

Arms Sales To Be Insured Via Russia Carriers

95UM0070A Moscow KOMMERSANT DAILY
in Russian No 201, 22 Oct 94 p 6

Article by Viktoriya Lebedeva, KOMMERSANT DAILY correspondent; place and date not given: "Purchasers of Russian Military Equipment Will Have To Pay Just a Little More" under the rubric "Agreement of 'Rosvooruzheniye' and Insurance Companies"

[FBIS Translated Text] The state company "Rosvooruzheniye" has decided to insure export deliveries of arms and military equipment with several Russian insurance companies. The Moscow insurance firms "Ingosstrakh," "Rossiya," "Vestrosso," "Garantiya," and "Yakor" obtained the right to participate in the insuring. Yesterday the insurers concluded an agreement on an insurance pool and determined their share of the responsibility through talks. One of the results of the change in the insurance plan - before "Rosvooruzheniye" used the services of "Ingosstrakh" only - may be an increase in the cost of the insurers' services.

Russian foreign trade organizations, which were the basis last year for the formation of a unified state exporter of military equipment, the company "Rosvooruzheniye" (VO "Oboroneksport," GVK "Spetsvneshtekhnika," the Main Directorate for Collaboration and Cooperation), have always carried out export operations on CIF [cost, insurance, freight] terms, including in the price of the goods expenses for transportation and cost of insurance. This is how work was also obtained by "Ingosstrakh," which until quite recently continued to have a monopoly on insuring export-import operations. This year "Ingosstrakh" also wrote a general policy for insuring "Rosvooruzheniye's" export shipments. However, according to information received by KOMMERSANT DAILY from informed sources, beginning this spring (when the management of "Rosvooruzheniye" actually became operational), a quite interesting situation took shape in the insuring of shipments of military equipment. "Ingosstrakh" retained the status of general insurer as before, but in practice all the deliveries were insured by the Moscow insurance company "Vestrosso."

At approximately the same time, several more Russian insurance firms began to seek contacts with the "Rosvooruzheniye" management. As a result, last month the state exporter adopted a decision to add five Russian insurance firms for insuring its interests: "Ingosstrakh," "Rossiya," "Vestrosso," "Garantiya," and "Yakor." For the time, the insurance companies will have an equal share of the responsibility for shipments - 20 percent for each risk. "Ingosstrakh" will receive a 2.5-percent commission on the total premium coming to them.

The determining factor in calculating insurance rates will be the region of shipments. So, insuring of shipments of military equipment to the countries of the Middle East

has up to now cost an average of 0.45 percent, while to India, 0.55 percent. Judging by everything, the average level of insurance rates will now increase.

The insurers intend to propose to the company to compile a list for them of planned shipments, on the basis of which they will group military equipment in terms of types and regions of shipment and establish differentiated rates. In the words of Aleksandr Bashlykov, chief of the department for insuring freight of the SAO "Rossiya," insurance will cost from 0.3 percent to 1 percent of the insured sum. By the way, 0.3 percent of the insured sum is the minimum rate at which the organizers of the re-insured protection, the western brokers Willis Corroon and Sedgwick, are willing to carry out their obligations.

In any event, an increase in the cost of insurance is in principle of no concern to "Rosvooruzheniye," since, in the final analysis, it falls to the purchasers of military equipment to pay for the insurance.

Viktoriya Lebedeva

[Boxed item]

This year Russia has entered into a number of contracts for arms delivery. On the basis of certain assessments the actual revenue from the export of weapons is close to \$4 billion. The geography of the deliveries, apart from China and the countries of the Middle East, will now include Southeast Asia and South America.

The greatest demand is for the "Smerch" volley-fire systems, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, "Iglas" surface-to-air missile complexes, antitank missiles, and also fighting ships and submarines with low and medium displacement.

PEACEKEEPING/PEACEMAKING

Uneasy Peacekeeping Situation in South Ossetia

95UM0066A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Nov 94 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Yuriy Gladkevich, Moscow-Tskhinval: "The Years Without War: They Brought Neither Tranquility nor Prosperity to the Residents of South Ossetia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The last time I was here was in January 1992. At that time the capital of South Ossetia was more like a besieged fortress. "Mkhedrioni" [Militia] detachments and other armed formations tightly surrounded it from the Tbilisi side and armed formations of local residents-Georgians also controlled the situation in the Georgian villages along the Tskhinval-Vladikavkaz Highway.

Later there were Dagomys and the decisions on the creation of trilateral peacekeeping forces, a cease fire, and the disengagement of the armed formations that were confronting each other. Thank God, wide-scale

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bloodshed ended and the people—both the Ossetians and the Georgians—breathed a sigh of relief: if only the war would end...

However, how have those years without war passed here? Has the region managed to recover and have tranquility and prosperity arrived here?

The Man With A Gun: A Blessing and a Misfortune

Major-General Viktor Konstantinov, commander of the Russian peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia, frankly stated in a military manner:

"The peacekeepers are controlling the situation. However, the initial causes of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict have not yet been eliminated..."

Lieutenant Colonel Igor Zaporozhan, the peacekeepers' Chief of Staff and Hero of the Soviet Union, added:

"On the whole, the peacekeepers provide a definite level of stability in the region. We are working in close contact and there is a mutual understanding on the fundamental issues. But the peacekeeping forces have a precisely defined circle of responsibilities beyond which, based on the big picture, we should not go. But that is not always possible: both the Georgians and the Ossetians who live here regard us as nearly the only real force."

It's obvious that this troubles Zaporozhan and his colleagues. The elimination of the military confrontation between Georgia and South Ossetia alas did not signify and to this day does not signify the arrival of peace on this soil. The opportunity to labor in peace and to walk and drive along the roads of the native region without fear—where is it?

The man with the gun here, in South Ossetia—that is a blessing. He defended this land from invasion, protected the honor of mothers, sisters and daughters from humiliation, and saved the lives of thousands of defenseless people. Today he (the trilateral peacekeeping forces play a special role here) remains the guarantor that the bloodshed will not resume. But the man with a gun—that is also a misfortune. During the war, practically everyone who could hold a weapon in his hands acquired one. And no one, despite the end of the war, has voluntarily surrendered it. And if a weapon becomes an ordinary tool of everyday activity, that means that you have to be prepared to fire it. In the absence of an "external enemy", a target is frequently selected among one's own.

There's a street in Tskhinval that bears the name of [first name indistinct] Dzhioyev. If that lad had died in those days when the Georgian detachments were laying siege to the city, we would only have to—bow our heads in his memory. But he in fact died already after the conflict—in the skirmishes between the South Ossetian guards and the OMON [special purpose militia detachments]...

In the majority of cases when people die here, it is impossible to link these tragedies to the activities of the "external enemy". The overwhelming majority of them—

are the consequence of ordinary crime which feels quite free and easy here. The local militia is not experiencing much success in the investigation of criminals.

"The republic's current leadership," said Zaporozhan, "expresses the intention to restore public order. However, will it be easy to do that in a region where thousands of unaccounted for arms are in circulation? From all appearances, no one plans to seize them.

"I confirm: no one actually intends to. What is more, here they talk about the inopportune and even the impossibility of that step. Therefore, it has not been excluded that the streets of Tskhinval will henceforth obtain the names of their recent defenders who died already in the days without war.

"Therefore, the people," concluded Zaporozhan, "go to the peacekeepers for protection even when they should go to the militia."

But the peacekeepers' forces and capabilities are not unlimited. The Russians have the largest force (Colonel Georgiy Dzhioyev, commander of the Ossetian peacekeepers, confirmed that), however, they also have many problems.

"If you talk about the military nucleus," thinks Zaporozhan, "then it's as if everything is normal. The battalion's soldiers are clothed, shod, fed, and equipped with the required equipment and weapons. But there is not only a battalion here, there is also a staff of observers who have to work a lot and who often drive to various areas of the region on urgent business. In the meantime, we often cannot even drive to the location of the incident—there isn't any gasoline."

But even if the peacekeepers had unlimited capabilities, they would most probably not be able to combat crime. They aren't designed to do that, they aren't trained to do that, yes and in principle they should not replace the local authorities and law enforcement structures.

Meanwhile, the criminal situation in this region is fraught with the new complication of the political situation. For example, several criminals recently escaped from their places of confinement in Georgia. And a skirmish took place between two Georgian Mafia groups already on October 16 not far from Tskhinval. An exchange of fire broke out in the area of the spontaneously created market on neutral territory where Georgian and Ossetian peasants exchange goods. Firing was also conducted against the peacekeeping forces posts that are located nearby and was terminated only after Russian peacekeepers became involved...

And this is already not war. This is the result of the actual powerlessness both of the Ossetian and Georgian power structures on the territories they control. And that is an example of how a criminal could provoke the next spiral of the interethnic conflict.

At the Destroyed Hearth

I will never forget the picture which I saw at my last arrival: a completely destroyed home on the outskirts of Tskhinval, and in the yard which, incidentally, was nearly all shot up, were some temporary structures made from old boards and tin cans. The furniture—a weapons' box instead of a table, a worn-out couch and a small temporary stove. And an old Ossetian man, totally frozen in that quite hard winter, frankly stated: even if my hearth has been destroyed, I am never going to leave here.

Right now, devastation does not strike the eye in Tskhinval. Having sorely missed home and farm work during the war, people have managed to restore and repair quite a bit, nearly without construction materials. Can't we say that in general the fire is burning in the hearth for the people of South Ossetia? That the overall site of the fire has been cleaned up and the walls of a new home are being raised? I think that it is early... Prior to the beginning of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, nearly 100,000 people lived on the territory of the South Ossetian Autonomy. This was one of the Central Asian regions of the Georgian SSR in which four major union enterprises and dozens of republic enterprises were located. Right now, no more than 70% of the territory of the former South Ossetian Autonomy has remained under the control of the RYuO [Republic of South Ossetia] authorities. Thousands of people have left the republic but thousands—from the internal regions of Georgia, from other regions, and from villages that were ravaged by the war—have arrived in Tskhinval. Under conditions when the economy has been ravaged by war and when only several enterprises are operating, and then at only 20-60% of capacity, the majority of the population of the city and the surrounding area live in poverty. There are more than 6,000 people who are officially registered as unemployed but in fact there are many more. Workers' average wages are 18,000-20,000 rubles which is barely enough for bread.

You can imagine the scale of the general destruction of the common hearth for the people of South Ossetia if you consider that, besides the war, an earthquake and flood, which inflicted enormous damage, occurred on this land in 1991 and that the two year economic, transport and energy blockade completed the matter. The damage that has been officially recognized and agreed to between Russia and Georgia is over R34 billion in June 1992 prices. Today that is hundreds of billions. Essentially, South Ossetia is currently living only on humanitarian assistance and Russian money. But alas, Russia has its own problems and Georgia is not at all fulfilling its obligations to render assistance. In accordance with the

Dagomys agreements, in 1992 Russia should have allocated R500 million and it did that. Georgia did not give any money either in 1992 or in 1993 and is also not providing a kopek right now. What is more, the Gori-Tskhinval Railway is blockaded by Georgia to this day and all cargoes that have been shipped to South Ossetian enterprises from suppliers have disappeared. The resources of South Ossetian debtors disappeared there after the closure of the Georgian Bank cash clearance center in Tskhinval.

"That is," explained Inal Mamiyev, chairman of the South Ossetian State Nykhas (Supreme Soviet) Committee on the Economy and Finances, "the republic was actually not only ravaged by war but also looted. The way out for our bank on the financial-credit range was completely blocked. Hence—additional burdens for our economy."

And yet, we think that not only external circumstances restrain the republic's economic revival. The economic barrenness of the republic's former leadership, that managed to organize a military rebuff to the enemy, is essentially recognized by many people here. It did practically nothing for the development of entrepreneurship. Privatization was restrained by all possible means. The land, if it was distributed to the population, it was only so that people could be fed from it and so the people would not annoy the government... And only right now has some progress become noticeable.

Yes, there is some progress but the inertia of the military confrontation, although to a lesser extent than a year to a year and a half ago, is being maintained to a degree. And the economy is still being placed on the back burner. The division of the resources that are arriving in the form of aid still remains the main thing. For example, approximately two months ago the Russian Government allocated R5 billion for the restoration of afflicted areas of the Republic of South Ossetia. And the South Ossetian leadership, jointly with the members of the Russian Commission on Restoration, have described in detail, to the ruble, where this money will go. Under a great deal of secrecy, an "unofficial source" made us to understand that they planned to utilize some—approximately R600 million—for the restoration of industry...

But then again, despite the sad state of the foundation of the people's prosperity and of the economy, the residents of the republic believe in a better future. This is, without a doubt, wonderful. But we must not forget the truism: the longer an assault rifle is in the hands of a man, the sharper the hoe and work implement, the more difficult it will be to take people out of the situation of a military camp and the more difficult it will be to embody this faith in real work.

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